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Terrorism, perpetrators and polarization: Evidence from natural experiments*

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Abstract

We analyze whether affective polarization – the extent to which citizens feel sympathy towards partisan in-groups and antagonism towards partisan out-groups – can be aggravated by terrorism violence. Terrorist attacks intensify pre-existing ideological worldviews and partisan leanings and bring divisive political issues to the fore. Yet, they can also lead individuals from the entire political spectrum to come together and dissociate from the terrorists and their radical ideas. To identify causal effects, we exploit a series of natural experiments in Great Britain and leverage the timing of fatal far-right and Islamic terrorist attacks and the date of interview of respondents in the British Election Study. We find that Islamic attacks increase affective polarization whereas far-right attacks depolarize the electorate. We demonstrate that this discrepancy is largely driven by the salience of the attack – and the resulting threat perceptions – and the attitudes towards contentious and polarizing issues.

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1 Introduction

Affective polarization is the "tendency for partisans to dislike and distrust those from the other party while favoring those of their own" (Druckman et al., 2021, p.28). It is captured by a group dynamic wherein membership triggers both positive feelings for the in-group, and negative evaluations of the out-group (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012, p. 407). Mass polarization has grown steadily in advanced Western democracies since the 1980s (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2022; Gidron, Adams and Horne, 2020), but what is driving it? Past explanations have prioritized slow-moving socio-economic factors, such as demographic changes, inequalities, immigration, and key transformations of the media environment, notably the introduction of digital TV and high-speed internet (see, e.g., Mason, 2015; Gidron, Adams and Horne, 2020; Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2022).

We contend that affective polarization also responds to unexpected shocks to public awareness of domestic security, and investigate whether it can be aggravated by acts of terrorism. To draw causal inferences, we exploit a series of natural experiments, and leverage the timing of fatal far-right and Islamic terrorist incidents in Great Britain and the date of interview of respondents in the British Election Study. Our results show that terrorism does contribute to shaping polarization in important ways, but the very direction and magnitude of its impact is conditional on the type of terrorism violence: whereas Islamic-extremism incidents increase the degree of polarization, far-right attacks decrease it. We provide evidence that this discrepancy is driven by the perceived salience of the incident and how it shapes the audience's threat perceptions; and different attitudes towards contentious and polarizing issues. On the one hand, Islamic attacks increase the salience of

terrorist threats, lead to more negative views of immigration and more support for the 'far-right', which polarize the audience. On the other hand, after far-right attacks, individuals tend to shift away from the (polarizing) tenets of a far-right political ideology.

We study the case of Great Britain, which has a long history of terrorism and political violence within its borders. Not surprisingly, the British public has long perceived terrorism as a direct risk to themselves or their families, and terrorism frequently ranks in the top two most important issues among voters (Goodwin, Willson and Stanley Jr, 2005; Bozzoli and Müller, 2011; Giani, Epifanio and Ivandic, 2022; Nussio, Böhmelt and Bove, 2021; Bove, Efthyvoulou and Pickard, 2022*b*). Whereas the high levels of risk perception are driven, in part, by several emblematic terrorist attacks, their salience extends beyond the immediate aftermath of the attack (de Roy van Zuijdewijn and Sciarone, 2021; Bove, Efthyvoulou and Pickard, 2022*a*). At the same time, Great Britain is an interesting example of growing affective partisanship outside the paradigmatic case of the United States (US). In fact, the British public displays some of the highest levels of polarization among OECD countries, prompting political commentators to warn about the increasing "tribalization" of British politics, particularly after the EU referendum (Duffy et al., 2019).

We argue that terrorist attacks, by suddenly increasing public awareness of threats to security, can polarize the audience. Reducing the threat of terrorism is viewed as a crucial public policy priority, so much so that constituents are willing to sacrifice civil liberties to reduce terrorist threats (Huddy, Khatib and Capelos, 2002; Davis and Silver, 2004; Giani, Epifanio and Ivandic, 2022; Hansen and Dinesen, 2022; Germann, Godefroidt and Mendez, 2022). Terrorism has also widespread cognitive and affective consequences for the public (Hansen et al., 2016), causing a "complex state of negative emotional arousal" (Godefroidt, 2021, p.5). By changing public cognitions, terrorism can cause out-group hostility (Böhmelt, Bove and Nussio, 2020; Van Hauwaert and Huber, 2020), lead to more support for right-wing parties (Bonanno and Jost, 2006; Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Aytaç and

Çarkoğlu, 2021), enhance support for conflict-perpetuating responses (Fisk, Merolla and Ramos, 2019), bolster attachment and support of the nation and its leaders (Dinesen and Jæger, 2013; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014; Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018) and generate negative evaluations of government performance (Holman, Merolla and Zechmeister, 2022; Falcó-Gimeno, Muñoz and Pannico, 2022).

We expect these cognitive shifts to be also important drivers of affective polarization and intensify political ideology, by triggering ideological conflict, but also through mechanisms which act on such group dynamics. We first develop arguments for an 'unconditional' impact of terrorism on affective polarization, and discuss whether its effect depends on the type of perpetrator, and particularly on whether the attack is perpetrated by Islamic versus far-right extremists. We then employ a quasi-experimental design to analyze individual affective polarization shortly before and after terrorist attacks using survey data from the British Election Study. We also consider data from Twitter to analyze the emotion content of tweets posted around the date of the four sample attacks. We show that, on aggregate, terrorist attacks do not affect polarization. Yet, lumping together two quite different typologies of terrorist actors conceal key differences among them. When we disaggregate by the type of perpetrator, that heterogeneity is unmasked, and we find competing results. Islamic-extremism incidents increase the degree of polarization, but far-right attacks decrease it.

We show that two key mechanisms are behind this important discrepancy. First, the salience of the incident and the resulting audience's threat perceptions. Islamic and far-right terrorist attacks are often framed differently, which determines the extent to which subjective perceptions of threat are triggered. Second, the two types of terrorism lead to different attitudes towards contentious and polarizing issues, in particular the opposition to immigration and the support for the 'far-right' more generally. En route, we also find evidence that polarization is affected by a drop in the approval rates for the prime minister,

particularly among supporters of the opposition party.

2 How terrorism affects polarization

What shapes affective polarization? Rising affective polarization has so far been explained as a product of 'social sorting': the increasing alignment of social composition (e.g., ethnicity, religion, gender, age, and place of residence) and political identity along party lines (Mason, 2015, 2018). This is theorized to create durable partisan social identities which act as 'tribes' and encourage hostility towards out-groups (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Harteveld, 2021). Beyond such 'sorting', other dynamic, socioeconomic features, such as high levels of unemployment and inequality (Gidron, Adams and Horne, 2020), can deepen affective polarization. Affective polarization has also been linked to various features of political discourse, with electoral campaigns dominated by negative advertising, for example,contributing to the creation of a more polarized electorate (Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016; Lau et al., 2017).

Particularly important for this research, extant explanations of the causes of affective polarization either appeal to the inherent psychology of group status (e.g., Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012), or connect it to perceived ideological differences between partisans (e.g., Marchal and Watson, 2021). The first explanation is largely rooted in the social psychology literature, which finds that group membership based even on 'trivial' characteristics tends to trigger positive affective responses towards group members, and negative feelings towards out-groups (Mackie, Devos and Smith, 2000; Smith, Seger and Mackie, 2007). These dynamics do not require policy or value attitudes and are consistent with a picture of the electorate as somehow unconstrained by party or ideological affiliation in their policy views (Kinder and Kalmoe, 2017).[1] This suggests that terrorist acts might trig-

[1] Mason (2018) harnesses survey data to show that 'identity-based ideology', which captures the extent

ger polarization through their psychological effects, which shape emotions and cognitions. Terror Management Theory (TMT) suggests that terrorist incidents remind the public about the inevitability of death. TMT describes the cognitive effects of citizens' 'awareness of mortality' (Burke, Martens and Faucher, 2010, p.155), which they manage through cultural and ideological worldviews (Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg, 2003). Terrorist incidents are thus theorized to trigger 'ideological intensification', wherein audiences entrench their commitment to pre-existing cultural worldviews, including "religious beliefs and political ideology, that convey shared values and dictate normative behavior" (Huddy and Feldman, 2011, p.2). Terrorism is shown to increase prejudicial attitudes towards out-groups or members of different cultural communities (see, e.g., Legewie, 2013; Nussio, Bove and Steele, 2019; Ferrín, Mancosu and Cappiali, 2020). We expect that activation of this 'ideological intensification effect' will deepen pre-existing partisan leanings, leading to increased affective polarization.

A second related explanation builds on the idea that there is an 'irreducible ideological component to affective polarization' (Marchal and Watson, 2021, p.3). Affective polarization is driven by large ideological differences between parties and candidates, because this makes electoral choice more consequential in the minds of partisans (Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016).[2] This suggests that terrorist acts might aggravate polarization by making divisive political issues even more salient and contentious. An extensive strand of literature finds a connection between terrorist attacks and the salience of debates over immigration, though the link between these issues appears empirically tenuous (see Helbling and Meierrieks, 2020, for an extensive review). This often translates into support for

to which respondents hold a strong ideological affiliation, affects social distance from out-groups twice as much as 'issue-based' ideology (see also Lelkes, 2018).

[2]Rogowski and Sutherland (2016) find evidence in support of this theory, by showing how candidates taking more extreme ideological positions prompt stronger, negative affective reactions among experimental subjects.

more stringent immigration policies and restrictions on core individual rights and liberties as counter-terrorism methods (Davis and Silver, 2004; Epifanio, 2016; Kim, 2016; Bove, Böhmelt and Nussio, 2021).

Debates over border control, immigration and refugee policies are highly polarized, as Hutter and Kriesi (2022, p. 349) demonstrate by surveying policy attitudes in several European countries, including the United Kingdom (UK). Thus, terrorism might stoke ideological divides by bringing counter-terrorism methods, such as border controls – which relate to "fundamental issues of rule and belonging and taps into various sources of conflict about national identity, sovereignty, and solidarity" (Hutter and Kriesi, 2022, p. 341) – to the fore. A similar dynamic might occur with respect to debates over de-radicalization and assimilation, an issue area which is similarly highly polarized (Clubb et al., 2019). Overall, political issues which involve themes of national identity and multiculturalism are particularly influential in exacerbating affective polarization (Gidron, Adams and Horne, 2020).

Terrorist attacks might also prime the salience of debates over domestic security, and, in particular, over surveillance and anti-terrorism measures which curtail personal freedoms (Bozzoli and Müller, 2011; Giani, Epifanio and Ivandic, 2022; Hansen and Dinesen, 2022). The heightened salience of restrictive surveillance and anti-terrorism measures can intensify affective polarization: individuals distinguish themselves from partisan out-groups by taking position on these policies, and becoming more entrenched in their support for (or opposition to) them, according to their pre-existing affiliation.

The above arguments, positing ideological and psychological explanations connecting terrorism to affective polarization, point to the following hypothesis:

***Hypothesis 1**: Terrorist acts increase affective polarization.*

Yet, as Godefroidt (2021) argues, the existing literature on the cognitive and attitudi-

nal effects of terrorism suggests that the identity of the perpetrator of terrorist incidents shapes the public responses they receive. For example, the extent to which terrorism causes out-group hostility is conditioned by whether the attack in question is motivated by Islamic extremism. This is partially a consequence of how exactly violent acts are framed by policymakers and the media. As Meier (2020, p.4) illustrates, there is a "dual tendency to call violence by non-white perpetrators 'terrorism' while not doing the same for white supremacist violence". This is linked to the fact that Islamic terrorism is uniquely perceived as an upheaval of the existing social order in Western states. Powell (2011)'s study of US news coverage of terrorist attacks since 9/11 similarly finds a thematic pattern, wherein Islamic terrorism is cast as the product of organized cells, representing a sustained threat, whereas domestic terrorism is cast as a minor threat, occurring in isolated incidents caused by troubled individuals. The coverage of MP Jo Cox's murder by a right-wing extremist (in June 2016) is a case in point: several UK media outlets described the perpetrator as a 'crazed loner', despite his affiliation with organized Neo-Nazi groups (Greenwald, 2016).

The perception that Islamic terrorist attacks as a product of organized terrorist cells leads to heightened salience of debates over controversial public policy responses which stoke polarization. Baele et al. (2019) document a 'terrorist label effect': the differences in perceptions of an attack enacted when it is labelled as 'terrorism' or as an 'Islamist attack' as opposed to being described in more neutral terms.[3] Thus, debates over polarizing issues, such as counter-terrorism methods, become more salient when attacks are popularly labelled as terrorism, which seems to occur exclusively in cases of Islamic (or jihadi-inspired) attacks. In a similar vein, a cultural backlash against immigrants is more pronounced in the wake of Islamic terrorism in the West (Germann, Godefroidt and Mendez,

[3]In fact, Baele et al. (2019) find significant differences in policy preferences when respondents are shown a hypothetical attack described as a terrorist incident.

2022), further contributing to the heated debate on the link between terrorism and border control or the social assimilation of immigrants (Helbling and Meierrieks, 2020).

Terrorist attacks are also more likely to cause heightened support for conservative (or "hawkish") parties and policies (see, e.g., Kibris, 2011; Brouard, Vasilopoulos and Foucault, 2018; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019; Aytaç and Çarkoğlu, 2021). Yet, the overall effect size of attacks on conservative shifts in public opinion is much higher in studies on Islamic terrorism as compared to those assessing the impact of non-Islamic attacks (Godefroidt, 2021).

Surges in support for right-leaning parties can fuel affective polarization to the extent that such parties' rhetoric tends to centre around antagonistic divisions in society – for example, between 'natives' and 'non-natives' (Harteveld, Mendoza and Rooduijn, 2021) – creating tensions between the two main political camps. In fact, in contrast to a simple conservative shift, we expect political ideology to become more intensified on both the political left and the political right, following an attack. The discourse that characterised the aftermath of the Manchester Arena bombings, in May 2017, reflects this dynamic: a number of right-wing politicians from the UK and abroad linked the attack to immigration, which prompted a backlash from left-wing politicians. Political statements reflected a wave of hardened popular attitudes to immigration following the attack.[4]

In contrast, right-leaning parties are unable to incorporate non-Islamic and far-right attacks into their 'native' versus 'non-native' narrative effectively. In fact, even far-right parties are forced to distance themselves from far-right terrorist attacks – as in the case of the political responses to Anders Breivik's terrorist attacks in Norway (Jakobsson and Blom, 2014; Solheim, 2020).[5] This raises the possibility that far-right terrorist attacks *dampen*,

[4]Available online. Accessed May 11, 2022.

[5]This dynamic was evident in the party infighting within UKIP that occurred in the aftermath of the Finsbury Park attack in June 2017. A number of UKIP politicians blamed the attack on the Muslim community. Anne Marie Waters, a leadership candidate for the party at the time, tweeted that the attack was 'war'

rather than aggravate, affective polarization, by decreasing popular support for some divisive right-leaning stances and forcing conservative parties to tone down their rhetoric on key issues, such as national identity or immigration. In the wake of far-right attacks, politicians across the political spectrum often come together to condemn the perpetrators. Even far-right parties are forced onto the defensive, and respond with public declarations of condemnation and softened rhetoric. Thus, the polarizing effects of some core tenets of a right-wing political ideology are expected to decrease in the wake of far-right terrorism.

Finally, and related to the above, there is a reason to suggest that some terrorist acts might reduce affective polarization when they trigger a 'rally round the flag' effect, wherein citizens exhibit increased trust in government and approval of national leaders (Dinesen and Jæger, 2013; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014; Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018; Falcó-Gimeno, Muñoz and Pannico, 2022). When such a dynamic is observable in times of crisis, a cross-partisan consensus often emerges and trust levels of opposition parties' supporters increase.

But the effects of this dynamic can be small in comparison with terrorism's other cognitive and attitudinal effects, such as its stoking of out-group hostilities (Böhmelt, Bove and Nussio, 2020; Godefroidt, 2021). Thus, in cases of Islamic terrorism, 'rally' dynamics might be overwhelmed by the countervailing ones of out-group hostility and support for controversial policy areas, which have larger-magnitude effects on polarization. As we have seen, these dynamics might be largely absent in cases of far-right terrorism. In such cases, as the activities of the far-right groups come under the spotlight and political parties come together to express their condemnation for the attack, citizens tend to dissociate themselves from some of the core values of the perpetrators and their political views (Jakobsson and Blom, 2014; Solheim, 2020). These dynamics might prove more visible

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which would not have occurred 'if not for Islam', a statement for which she was rebuked by the UKIP leader Paul Nuttall and deselected. Available online: here and here. Accessed May 11, 2022.

because other countervailing dynamics are absent.[6]

This discussion leads us to formulate a second hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 2**: Islamic attacks are more likely to increase affective polarization, while far-right attacks are more likely to dampen affective polarization.*

3 Empirical Design

3.1 Data and variables

We use individual-level data from the British Election Study (BES), an internet panel survey with a stratified random probability sample of citizens living in England, Scotland and Wales. The BES runs from February 2014 (wave 1) to December 2019 (wave 19), and contains questions designed to capture the respondents' political preferences and attitudes on key issues, such as immigration and support for the incumbent.

Our main outcome variable relies on the following question, which is worded in exactly the same way across waves: "How much do you like or dislike each of the following parties?"; with possible responses ranging along an 11-point scale from 0 "Strongly dislike" to 10 "Strongly like" (commonly referred to as like-dislike scores). We exploit the answers to this question when asked about the Conservative Party and the Labour Party – the two dominant parties in British politics over the sample period[7] – and create a mea-

[6] As voters might expect the incumbent to prevent terrorist incidents or mitigate their consequences, terrorist attacks might also damage the reputation of sitting political leaders (Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Falcó-Gimeno, Muñoz and Pannico, 2022). To the extent that these 'retrospective incumbent punishment' and the 'rally' dynamics are more or less prevalent among supporters of the sitting prime minister, terrorist attacks can dampen or increase polarization. This issue is explored in Section 5.

[7] The two parties have received the largest vote shares in all general elections since World War II, supplying both the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.

sure of party affinity distance. Specifically, our outcome variable, *Affective Polarization*, is calculated by the absolute difference between the like-dislike scores for the two major parties, with higher values indicating a greater degree of animosity towards one of the two parties. For example, the maximum value of 10 is recorded for an individual if they answer "Strongly like" (value 10) about one party and "Strongly dislike" (value 0) about the other.

Whilst there is no single accepted measure of affective polarization, the extent to which citizens like one party and dislike another one has been commonly used in the related literature (see, e.g., Rogowski and Sutherland, 2016; Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar et al., 2019; Ward and Tavits, 2019). This is mainly due to the broad availability of like-dislike scores, as this is one of the few questions that is asked systematically in surveys. Moreover, it allows researchers to measure affective polarization for the full set of respondents – both non-partisans and partisans alike – and covers all situations where citizens perceive there to be two distinct left-right political camps (like in the UK). In standard like-dislike questions, respondents are not primed to make an assessment on competency or ideology and can answer on a continuous scale to express a variety of views, such as adoration, apathy and hostility (Ward and Tavits, 2019), thus tapping into the essence of affective polarization (Wagner, 2021). Finally, this measure corrects for potential bias arising from differential item functioning, since it relies on differences rather than levels (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Lelkes, 2016).

Using the BES, we also construct supplementary outcome variables to test the key mechanisms underpinning our results. To do so, we utilise information on what the respondent believes the most important issue facing the country is; preferences about immigration; the support for the UKIP party (as the main far-right party over the sample period); and approval ratings of the prime minister. Furthermore, our analysis considers the full range of respondents' socio-demographic attributes and their location of residence

at the local authority district (LAD) level. A full description of all variables used in the analysis is provided in *SI Appendix* Table B.1.

3.2 Methodology

We exploit a series of natural experiments in Great Britain in which recent major terrorist attacks took place while the BES waves were being fielded, based on the 'Unexpected Event during Survey Design' (UESD, Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020). In this setting, identification relies on the assumption that the timing of the attacks is exogenous and largely randomly assigned relative to that of the interviews. This exogenous variation allows us to partition individuals into a 'treatment' group (those interviewed just after the attack) and a 'control' group (those interviewed just before the attack), and examine the causal effect of terrorism on the outcome variables by comparing responses in the two groups.

We consider four major terrorist incidents that occurred over the period 2016-2019: the murder of Jo Cox MP (16 June 2016); the Manchester Arena bombings (22 May 2017); the Finsbury Park attack (19 June 2017); and the London Bridge stabbing (29 November 2019). The rationale for this selection is twofold. First, they all coincided with recent BES waves; i.e., waves 8, 12, 13 and 18, respectively. Second, they all received widespread, national media coverage and resulted in at least one fatality. This implies that, irrespective of where the attacks occurred, the whole population was potentially exposed to them.[8] Since these were the only major attacks between 2016 and 2019 that overlapped with the fieldwork of a BES wave, their choice (among all major attacks that occurred over this period) is as random as their timing. Another key advantage of using these four specific attacks is that they can be neatly separated by perpetrator type: the Jo Cox MP murder and the Finsbury

[8] As evidence of this exposure, *SI Appendix* Figures B.2 and B.3 provide examples of national newspaper front pages covering the attacks.

Park attack were committed by far-right extremists, whereas the Manchester Arena attack and London Bridge stabbings were carried out by Islamic extremists. This juxtaposition is crucial for testing ***Hypothesis 2***.[9]

We estimate the following model specification:

$$y_{idw} = \alpha + \beta \textit{Post-attack}_{idw} + \delta \mathbf{X}_{idw} + \lambda_{dw} + \varepsilon_{idw} \tag{1}$$

where y_{idw} is the degree of affective polarization – or an outcome variable testing the underlying mechanisms – for individual i, living in LAD d, and interviewed in wave w; $\textit{Post-attack}_{idw}$ is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if the individual was interviewed after the date of an attack, and 0 otherwise;[10] $\mathbf{X}_{idw}$ is a vector of covariates that includes age, age squared, and dummies for the following: females, highest level of education (below GCSE, GCSE/A-level/Diploma or a Bachelor's degree or above), employment status (employed, student/other, retired or unemployed/not working), marital status (single, in a relationship or separated/divorced/widowed), whether the individual has children, religious affiliation (no religion, Christian, Islam or all else), and a White-British ethnicity; λ_{dw} represents LAD-by-wave fixed effects;[11] and, ε_{idw} is an error term, clustered at the LAD level.

One important choice in the UEDS is the bandwidth of days considered around the event date (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020). On the one hand, using short time windows before and after the attacks can help to substantiate the as-if random treat-

[9] *SI Appendix* Section A offers background material on the four sample attacks, and *SI Appendix* Figure B.1 presents a map with the location and key characteristics of these attacks.

[10] To avoid measurement errors, we exclude individuals who were interviewed on the same day as an attack.

[11] The inclusion of these fixed effects restricts the pre- and post-attack comparisons to respondents interviewed around the same terrorist attack and living in the same LAD, and removes biases arising from systematic differences in how the survey waves were conducted (Balcells and Torrats-Espinosa, 2018).

ment assignment assumption and to minimize the probability of other events driving the estimated effects. On the other hand, very narrow bandwidths are associated with small sample sizes (low statistical power) and effects that tend to be very local, which can limit the generalizability of the results. To trade off these opposing concerns, our baseline specification employs a 7-day bandwidth; that is, we compare individuals interviewed within 7 days after the attacks with those interviewed within 7 days before the attacks. In this way, we rely on a relatively narrow bandwidth without compromising the statistical power of our analysis, even when we run separate regressions for each individual attack. Nevertheless, in *SI Appendix* Section C.3, we show that our inferences do not change when we employ a tighter, 3-day bandwidth.

3.3 Threats to identification

The identification of valid causal estimates hinges on two key assumptions: excludability (differences between treatment and control groups are the sole consequence of the terrorist event) and ignorability (selection of the moment of interview should be as good as random).

The primary threat to excludability is that our β estimate captures some pre-existing trends in polarization, which are unrelated to the terrorist attacks. Whilst this is unlikely given the purely random timing of terrorist attacks relative to that of the interviews, we perform two tests to address this possibility. First, we exploit the panel dimension of the BES and augment Eq. 1 with the lagged value of the dependent variable: that is, individual i's level of polarization as observed in the previous wave $(w-1)$. This set-up enables us to account for the baseline level of the outcome variable (similar to a difference-in-differences design) and also controls for any bias that may arise from the omission of unobserved characteristics (Nussio, 2020; Bove, Efthyvoulou and Pickard, 2022*b*; Pickard, Efthyvoulou

and Bove, 2022).[12] Second, we test directly for the existence of pre-existing time trends by considering placebo treatments at an arbitrary time point at the left of the cutoff points (see *SI Appendix* Section C.2).

The main threat to ignorability comes from the possibility that individuals with different characteristics may respond to the survey at different times and this may be predictive of the outcome. In *SI Appendix* Table B.2, we conduct balancing tests comparing individuals interviewed before and after the attacks across the observed characteristics in vector $\mathbf{X}_{idw}$. We report the means of covariates and the p-value of a conventional t-test of the difference in means across the treatment and control groups, both in the far-right attack sample and the Islamic attack sample. Overall, the results reveal a strong balance across the two groups for most of the covariates. Even though a couple of them (i.e., age and employment status) show a statistically significant difference in means across treatment and control units, the magnitude of this difference is very small and therefore could not sensibly indicate a violation of the ignorability assumption (see, e.g., Depetris-Chauvin, Durante and Campante, 2020). Nevertheless, to ensure that our results are not affected by such minor differences, we report estimates both before and after augmenting the specification with vector $\mathbf{X}_{idw}$. We also show that our results hold when we re-weight the samples through entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012), such that the distribution of covariates among control units matches the moment conditions of the treated units (see *SI Appendix* Section C.4).

[12]The disadvantage of using information from previous waves is that it reduces the samples sizes significantly and makes the estimates more susceptible of being affected by past events, including exposure to previous terrorist attacks.

4 The impact of terrorism on affective polarization

4.1 Graphical evidence

We begin with a graphical exploration of the impact of terrorism on polarization. Figure 1 presents the histogram of *Affective Polarization* in the week before and after the attacks when our sample includes all four attacks (left panel), the two far-right attacks (center panel) and the two Islamic attacks (right panel). Looking first at the full sample, the figure shows very little movement in the distribution of polarization when comparing the post-attack period to the pre-attack period. Turning next to the histograms for the two attack typologies, we can observe important differences. After far-right attacks, the distribution shifts to the left, indicating that individuals are reporting a less polarized view about the two dominant parties. This is particularly clear when examining the maximum (minimum) value, 10 (0), which indicates a large decrease (increase) in the post-attack period. On the other hand, after Islamic attacks, the distribution shifts to the right, albeit the changes appear to be of a smaller magnitude relative to that of far-right attacks. Overall, this figure provides some first evidence against ***Hypothesis 1*** and in favour of ***Hypothesis 2***. We now turn to regression analysis to establish and quantify the causal relationships.

—- Figure 1 about here —

4.2 Main results

Table 1 shows the OLS estimation results of Eq. 1.[13] Columns (1) and (2) present the (average) treatment effect based on the full sample of all four attacks, before and after

[13]The full tables of the results upon which Table 1 and Figures 2, 3, 5, 6 and 8 are based are reported in *SI Appendix* Section E.

the inclusion of vector $\mathbf{X}_{idw}$ in the model. The evidence obtained suggests that terrorism has no effect on affective polarization and fails to support ***Hypothesis 1***. This, however, may be driven by the fact that we have pooled together two different typologies of terrorist actors with opposite effects on the outcome variable, as implied by ***Hypothesis 2***. To test for this, we run the same regression set-up as before, but we now make a distinction between the two far-right attacks and the two Islamic attacks (see columns (4)-(5) and (7)-(8), respectively). The results are striking. Both types of terrorism seem to induce significant changes in the affective reactions to parties, but the effects are indeed in the opposite direction: far-right attacks decrease individuals' level of affective polarization, whereas Islamic attacks increase it. Substantively, the estimates in columns (5) and (8) suggest that after a far-right attack, *Affective polarization* decreases by 0.17 units on the 0-10 scale (a decrease that amounts to 5% of the standard deviation of the variable); and after an Islamic attack, *Affective polarization* increases by 0.09 units on the 0-10 scale (an increase that amounts to 3% of the standard deviation of the variable). These are quite large effects if one considers that they refer to exposure to a single terrorist incident.[14]

Columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 1 investigate the sensitivity of these (baseline) results to augmenting Eq. 1 with the lagged dependent variable, *Lagged affective polarization*. Despite the substantial reduction in the sample sizes, the treatment effect of far-right (Islamic) attacks remains negative (positive) and statistically significant at the 1% level — though slightly smaller in magnitude, which is not surprising given that a lot of variation in the outcome variable is now absorbed by the lagged value.

—- Table 1 about here —

[14]Put differently, our estimated treatment effects suggest that approximately 1.76 million fewer people (700 thousand more people) exhibit high values of affective polarization after a far-right (Islamic) attack than before that attack. This is based on a specification with a binary outcome variable that equals 1 for values above 5 (the median of the continuous measure), and 0 for values equal or below 5 (see *SI Appendix* Section C.7).

To explore more thoroughly these dynamics, we estimate Eq. 1 separately for each individual attack/wave. Figure 2 presents the corresponding treatment effects – along with their 90% and 95% confidence intervals – before and after adding the individual-level controls. Scanning down the figure, the consistent effect of attacks motivated by the same ideology is stark: both far-right attacks (Jo Cox murder and Finsbury Park attack) cause a negative shift in affective polarization, and both Islamic attacks (Manchester Arena bombing and London Bridge stabbing) cause a positive shift in affective polarization. In addition, the magnitude of the effect across attacks with the same perpetrator type is very similar, which suggests that the underlying terror ideology is what matters for a change in polarization, and not the severity of the attack (as measured, for example, by the number of victims). This is particularly evident when we compare the treatment effects for the Finsbury Park attack and the London Bridge stabbing: two London attacks with a similar number of victims but a different perpetrator type, causing the opposite changes in the affective reactions to parties.

—- Figure 2 about here —

4.3 Robustness tests

To corroborate our key findings and lend further credibility to our causal claims, we perform a number of robustness checks that we report, and discuss in detail, in *SI Appendix* Section C.

Briefly, Section C.1 shows that the results are robust to employing a measure of affective polarization that accounts for all UK political parties and their size, as set out by Wagner (2021). Section C.2 illustrates that there are no pre-existing trends to the left of the cutoff points, a check recommend by Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2020). Section C.3 shows that our results are not sensitive to using a narrower (3-day) bandwidth. Section

C.4 documents robustness when we use entropy weighting to produce covariate balance between the treatment and control units (Hainmueller, 2012). Section C.5 shows that the results hold when we exclude all respondents who live in the same government office region (one region at a time). Section C.6 shows that the statistical significance of our estimates persists when we cluster the standard errors at the LAD-by-wave level (rather than at the LAD level). Finally, Section C.7 demonstrates that our inferences do not change when we use a binary measure of affective polarization, which is constructed by cutting the continuous variable at the median.

5 Mechanisms

In this section, we explore some of the key mechanisms underpinning the relationship between terrorism and affective polarization, conditional on the typology of terrorist actors.

5.1 Terrorism salience

The first mechanism is based on the 'terrorist label effect' (Baele et al., 2019) – i.e., correctly framing an attack as "terrorism" – can heighten the subjective perceptions of threat. Attacks motivated by radical interpretation of Islam are popularly labelled as terrorism, and are usually framed by politicians and the media as a major threat to national security and democratic values. On the other hand, far-right terrorist incidents are often portrayed as minor incidents committed by troubled, mentally ill loners, and lack the 'terrorism' label when discussed in the media (see, e.g., Greenwald, 2016). These labelling differences can determine the salience of debates over controversial policy responses and influence an individual's pattern of affect towards political parties.

To test this mechanism, we exploit information on citizens' beliefs about the most important issue facing the country, and construct a binary indicator that takes value 1 if an

individual believes that terrorism is the most important national problem (else 0). We then estimate Eq. 1 using this binary indicator as the outcome variable and report the treatment effects separately for far-right attacks and Islamic attacks. As shown in Figure 3, the magnitude of the *Post-attack* estimate for Islamic attacks far outstrips that for far-right attacks. Specifically, after an Islamic attack, the probability of reporting terrorism as the most important issue increases by about 24 percentage points, which is almost five times as large as the increase in the same probability following a far-right attack.[15] These findings support the idea that Islamic attacks are perceived by the general public as more threatening or detrimental for the social welfare, compared to far-right attacks. Therefore, the debate surrounding Islamic attacks is far more salient and can bleed into increased levels of affective polarization.

—- Figure 3 about here —

5.2 Support for immigration and far-right stances

The type of debate that terrorist attacks stimulate – particularly around contentious policies – and the different attitudes towards (polarizing) immigration and far-right stances can help explain why Islamic and far-right terrorism have opposite effects on polarization.

The terrorism-immigration nexus is not new. Previous studies have documented that Islamic extremism increases nationalism, leads to higher levels of anti-immigrant sentiment among the native population, and triggers more hostility towards out-groups (see, e.g., Legewie, 2013; Nussio, Bove and Steele, 2019; Ferrín, Mancosu and Cappiali, 2020). This can also bring the issue of counter-terrorism methods – in particular border controls

[15] In *SI Appendix* Section C.8, we replicate this analysis for four other popular issues facing the country: austerity, the economy, the environment and immigration. We observe that the post-attack change in the probability of reporting one of these issues as the most important national problem is either zero or marginally negative, and this applies to both far-right and Islamic attacks.

– to the fore. After a far-right attack, however, citizens may soften their feelings towards immigrants (Pickard, Efthyvoulou and Bove, 2022) to avert any association with the ideology of the perpetrator. This is because the use of violent tactics makes it more likely that movements and political actors are perceived as unreasonable by citizens, who identify less with, and ultimately support less, the ideas they promote (Simpson, Willer and Feinberg, 2018; Muñoz and Anduiza, 2019).

To test how the identity of the perpetrator affects immigration stances, we first use Twitter data and analyze the emotion content of immigration-related tweets posted around the date of the four sample attacks. Figure 4 compares the pre- and post-attack average values of three negative sentiments about immigration (fear, anger and sadness), calculated using the share of words assigned to a given sentiment across all lexicon-identified words included in the immigration-related tweets.[16] As can be seen quite clearly, there is a notable increase in negative sentiments associated with immigration in the aftermath of the two Islamic attacks, with growing feelings of fear and sadness, and to a lesser extent anger. On the contrary, after the two far-right attacks, fear subsides and there is only a small increase in sadness.

—- Figure 4 about here —

As as second step, we return to the BES and exploit information on the respondents' attitudes towards immigration, as captured by their answers to 'whether the UK should allow more immigrants to come to the country to live'; 'whether immigration enriches cultural life'; and 'whether immigration is good for the economy' – ranging from either 1 to 7 or 1 to 10, with higher values indicating more pro-immigration attitudes. The limitation of these questions is that they were not included in waves 12 and 18, and thus

[16]To approach the emotional content of text analytically, we use the NRC Emotion Lexicon tool. More details about the Twitter data collection and coding are presented in *SI Appendix* Section D.

cannot be used for two Islamic attacks. Nevertheless, examining the treatment effect of far-right terrorism on immigration attitudes can provide further insights on whether this type of terrorism can indeed trigger more tolerance, rather than more hostility, towards out-groups. Figure 5 reports the corresponding treatment effects, and provides evidence in line with the above: exposure to terrorism perpetrated by far-right extremists sways the population towards a more pro-immigration stance.

—- Figure 5 about here —

Related to changes in immigration preferences, terrorism can shape the affective reactions to parties by changing the support for (more general) far-right positions – many of which are shared to varying degrees by mainstream conservative parties, such as concerns about the protection of national identities. Right-leaning parties exploit the occurrence of Islamic terrorist attacks using the 'natives' versus 'non-natives' rhetoric and this surge can influence the extent to which people feel more warmly or coldly towards parties at the two sides of the political spectrum. However, after far-right terrorist incidents, the evidence shows that individuals tend to shift away from the politics of the far-right (Solheim, 2020; Pickard, Efthyvoulou and Bove, 2022), as politicians of all political colours come together to condemn the perpetrators. This, in turn, can lower people's interparty hostility.

To explore this channel, we estimate Eq. 1 using three alternative measures of far-right support/affect as outcome variables: how likely it is to vote for UKIP; the like-dislike score for UKIP; and the like-dislike score for Nigel Farage – with all three measures ranging on a 0-10 scale. Figure 6 shows the corresponding results while distinguishing between far-right and Islamic attacks. The consistent opposite pattern of effects across attacks with different underlying ideology stands out once again. After far-right attacks, citizens express a lower intention to vote for UKIP and more negative feelings about the party and its figurehead; whereas, after Islamic attacks, there is a concerted increase in the party's elec-

toral support and a small (and statistically less robust) increase in the two favourability ratings.

—- Figure 6 about here —

5.3 Support for the incumbent

A third possible mechanism is related to how terrorism impacts the support for the incumbent prime minister (PM). Terrorist acts may activate a 'rally round the flag' effect – wherein citizens exhibit increased trust in government and approval of national leaders – leading to a lower degree of polarization. This effect might become more visible in the case of far-right terrorism due to the absence of other countervailing dynamics (as shown above).

To test this mechanism, we perform again a sentiment analysis using Twitter data as in Section 5.2, but we now exploit information on tweets containing keywords related to the PM and focus on the sentiment of 'trust'. Figure 7 displays the average values before and after the four sample attacks, separated by perpetrator type. As we can see, whereas a 'rally' effect is apparent after far-right attacks, as trust associated to the PM increases, the opposite effect seems to operate after Islamic attacks, as trust decreases.

—- Figure 7 about here —

As a further test, we employ data from the BES and estimate Eq. 1 using the like-dislike score for the incumbent Conservative PM as the outcome variable.[17] As shown at the top part of Figure 8, only after Islamic attacks does the incumbent's favourability rating change, with individuals reporting significantly lower levels of affinity for the sitting PM.

[17] David Cameron was the PM at the time of the Jo Cox murder; Theresa May at the time of the Manchester Arena and Finsbury Park attacks; and Boris Johnson at the time of the London Bridge stabbing.

It is unclear, however, how this may translate to shifts in the overall degree of polarization. To shed light on this, we run the same regression as before but we now focus on the subsamples of respondents who identify with the Conservative or the Labour party.[18] As can be seen in the two lower parts of Figure 8, while Conservative supporters' perception of the PM is largely unaffected by both far-right and Islamic attacks, Labour supporters become more negative in their affect towards the PM following an Islamic attack. Even though the evidence here does not support a 'rally' dynamic, the fact that Labour supporters seem to hold the Conservative PM responsible for not protecting the country from attacks that generate a widespread sense of threat (i.e., those inspired by Islamic extremism) can further explain why affective polarization increases following this type of attacks.

—- Figure 8 about here —

6 Conclusions

Suppose citizens are suddenly and unexpectedly exposed to terrorist violence in their country. Will this traumatic event lead to a more polarized pattern of affect towards political parties? Numerous studies have explored some of the most important 'slow-moving' social, political and economic factors behind the rise in affective polarization. We investigate whether and how an unexpected shock to domestic security and personal safety can contribute to it. Building on terror management theory, we argue that exposing subjects to news about terrorists incidents confronts them with thoughts about death, which lead audiences to entrench their commitment to pre-existing cultural worldviews. This 'ideological intensification' increases the prevalence of prejudiced attitudes towards outgroups. This, in turn, suggests an attitudinal response to terrorist attacks wherein pre-

[18]To construct this variable, we use the BES item asking: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?".

existing partisan leanings are intensified. At the same time, terrorist acts might aggravate polarization by making divisive political issues more salient. As citizens become more polarized around key issues, such as national identity, affective polarization increases.

We explore the case of Great Britain, where terrorism is a particularly salient issue in the minds of constituents. We find that terrorism does affect polarization, but much of its impact is mediated by the type of perpetrator: whereas Islamic attacks contribute to increasing affective polarization, far-right attacks tend to depolarize the public. We show that two main mechanisms can explain these divergent results: the salience of the incident and how it shapes the audience's threat perceptions; and different attitudes towards contentious and polarizing issues, like the support for immigration and the 'far-right'.

While policy-based polarization – the degree to which party elites or the public have divergent policy preferences – has been credited with lending the public more coherent political attitudes (Levendusky, 2010), affective polarization is more difficult to cast in positive terms. And its effects go beyond politics. According to recent research, polarization is straining the social fabric of our society by impacting families, workplaces, neighbourhoods, and institutions (Jilani and Smith, 2019). For one, it drives changes in social behaviors and relationships (see, e.g., Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012), as 'everyday interactions and life choices are compromised by politics' (Iyengar et al., 2019, p.136). Even in their residential communities, people are increasingly segregating themselves and demonizing their opponents (Jilani and Smith, 2019). These social effects can spill over into economic effects by hampering market exchanges (McConnell et al., 2018) and confound coordinated policy responses which reach across party lines (Druckman et al., 2021) – the latter effect being particularly problematic in the context of national crises. As such, contributing to a better understanding of the determinants of affective partisanship seems necessary for a correct evaluation of policy attitudes.

Figure 1: Distribution of affective polarization



Notes: The figure presents the density of *Affective Polarization* in the week before and after the attacks when our sample includes all four attacks (left panel), the two far-right attacks (center panel) and the two Islamic attacks (right panel).

Table 1: Terrorism exposure and polarization: main results

	Affective Polarization								
	All attacks			Far-right attacks			Islamic attacks		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post-attack	0.007	-0.002	-0.001	-0.182***	-0.170***	-0.131***	0.113***	0.088***	0.063***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.023)
Lagged affective polarization			0.810***			0.795***			0.828***
			(0.003)			(0.004)			(0.004)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓		✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370
R-squared	0.044	0.059	0.667	0.051	0.063	0.647	0.036	0.059	0.694
Observations	64,378	61,750	45,491	33,175	31,831	25,081	31,203	29,919	20,410

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 2: Terrorism exposure and polarization: by attack



Notes: The dependent variable is *Affective Polarization*. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

Figure 3: Terrorism as the most important issue



Notes: The dependent variable is a binary variable capturing whether the respondent believes that terrorism is the most important issue facing the country. All specifications include LAD $\times$ wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. The specifications for Islamic attacks are based on data for one attack, as there are no available data for the other attack. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

Figure 4: Sentiment scores for tweets about immigration:
fear, anger, sadness



Notes: Far-right attacks: N=6,879 from a sample of 2,751,913 tweets. Islamic attacks: N=3,834 from a sample of 2,063,440 tweets. Black bars denote the standard error of the mean.

Figure 5: Far-right terrorism exposure and immigration attitudes



Notes: The dependent variable is listed on the vertical axis. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

Figure 6: Terrorism exposure and support for the 'far-right'



Notes: The dependent variable is listed on the vertical axis. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. The "Prob. of Voting UKIP (Islamic)" and "Like Nigel Farage (Far-right)" specifications are based on data for one attack, as there are no available data for the other attack. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

Figure 7: Sentiment scores for tweets about the prime minister: trust



Notes: Far-right attacks: N=6,111 from a sample of 2,751,913 tweets. Islamic attacks: N=6,661 from a sample of 2,063,440 tweets. Black bars denote the standard error of the mean.

Figure 8: Terrorism exposure and support for the incumbent



Notes: The dependent variable is the like-dislike score (0-10) for the incumbent prime minister. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

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Terrorism, perpetrators and polarization: Evidence from natural experiments

Supplementary Information (SI) Appendix

For Online Publication

A. Background Material

In this section, we present background information about the two far-right and the two Islamic terrorist attacks that we use in our analysis.

Jo Cox MP murder – Far-right extremism – 16th June 2016

Labour party MP Jo Cox was murdered on the streets of her constituency of Batley and Spen in Yorkshire, a week before the Brexit referendum, on June 16, 2016. The perpetrator was Thomas Mair, a 53-years-old white supremacist, whose violent hatred extended to white people he deemed "collaborators". Although Mair's obsession with Nazism, white supremacy and apartheid-era South Africa, as well as his proximity to extreme-right movements was widely documented,[1] Jo Cox's murder was not immediately identified as an episode of terrorism (see, e.g., Figure B.2). Still, the media latterly identified the perpetrator as a "far-right terrorist", and, although Mair was trialed for murder, the persecutors claimed that his crimes were "nothing less than acts of terrorism", while the judge noted, in the motivations accompanying Mair's life sentence, that his "inspiration was not love of country but admiration for Nazism".[2]

The British public were deeply shocked: Union Flags on British public buildings, including the Palace of Westminster, were flown at half mast, and the Brexit referendum campaign was suspended by both sides. Bi-partisan condolences and tributes to Cox immediately came from prominent UK leaders, including the Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, the Labour party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, and MEP Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party, and prominent Leave.EU campaigner.[3] Farage came under the spotlight in the aftermath to the attack, as Cox's murderer was heard shouting, on the day of the assassination, "Britain First", the name of a far-right organization aligned with Farage's party and policies. This spurred some commentators and scholars to draw parallels between the aggressive rhetoric oft-adopted by the Leave campaign, and the motivations behind the terrorist attack (Jones, 2019).[4] Farage rebutted these accusations, dismissing the murder as being down to "one deranged, dangerous individual".[5] Yet, leaders

[1] Available online here, here and here (last accessed: 07/07/22).

[2] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22). A search on *LexisNexis* utilising the keywords (*"terrorist" OR "terrorism"*) *AND "Jo Cox"* returned 570 results in the month following the attack.

[3] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).

[4] For more information on the salience of terrorism in the Brexit campaign, see: Bove, Efthyvoulou and Pickard (2022) and Pickard, Efthyvoulou and Bove (2022).

[5] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).

of far-right groups – including Paul Golding, the leader of Britain First – rushed, at least initially, to distance themselves from the attack,[6] while extreme-right activists' online reactions ranged from blaming Mair's mental-health issues, rather than ideological drive, to going as far as insinuating the "truthfulness" of the attack.[7]

Finsbury Park attack – Far-right extremism – 19th June 2017

The second far-right attack in our sample took place on June 19, 2017, and involved a 48-year-old man, Darren Osborne, who drove a van into a crowd of Muslims near the Finsbury Park Mosque, in north London, causing one death and injuring ten people. Osborne was apparently motivated by his anger for the Islamic terrorist attacks in London and Manchester in 2017, and by a child grooming scandal involving men of Asian origin, taking place in Rochdale (UK). The incident was immediately dealt with as a terrorist attack, by politicians, counter-terrorism police, as well as in the media (see Figure B.2).

Most of the newspapers' front pages on the day following the attack tended to focus more on the perpetrator, rather than on the victims, although with some notable exceptions (e.g., the Guardian and the Independent). Also important is the fact that the affiliation to far-right groups appears to be secondary in the reporting, in contrast with the patterns generally occurring following after Islamic attacks. Yet, media coverage for the attack was rather high, with 1,152 results on LexisNexis in the first month after the attack.[8]

The entire political spectrum openly condemned the action – PM Theresa May praised London's multiculturalism and promised a stronger effort against Islamophobia — as did religious leaders from different creeds, while Prince Charles visited the Finsbury Park Mosque to meet the community leaders.[9] Yet, some comments on the social media pages of far-right groups, like Britain First, justified the attack, or defined the perpetrator as a "hero".[10]

Manchester Arena attack – Islamic extremism – 22nd May 2017

At 22:37 on 22 May 2017, Salman Ramadan Abedi, a 22-year old Mancunian man of Libyan descent, detonated a home-made bomb inside the foyer of the Manchester Arena, as peo-

[6] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[7] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[8] Keywords: textit("terrorist" OR "terrorism") AND "Finsbury Park".
[9] Available online here, here and here (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[10] Available online here and here (last accessed: 07/07/22).

ple were leaving a concert by Ariana Grande. Twenty-three attendees – six of them children – died in the explosion,[11] while, according to the independent public inquiry that followed the attack, 1,017 were injured to some degree, with 112 requiring hospitalisation.[12] The Manchester Arena attack was the deadliest episode of terrorism in Britain since the London bombings of July 7, 2005.[13] Following the attack, the government immediately raised the terrorism threat level to "critical", the highest in a scale of five, before reverting to the pre-existing level – "severe" – five days later.[14]

When the government updated its counter-terrorism strategy in 2018, it pointed at the bombing as part of the motivations leading to the repeal of the pre-existing policy.[15] In 2022, testimonies from the MI5 in the Manchester Arena Inquiry, reported in fact that the MI5 had sufficient intelligence to open an investigation against the perpetrator, Salman Abedi, a month before the attack and treat him as a threat to national security. However, it had failed to do so because the agency was "struggling to cope" with increasing workload, which precluded careful consideration of the case, hence the sharing of data with counter-terrorism police and other agencies.[16]

British newspapers reported widely on the attack in its immediate aftermath with graphic, emotional coverage. The Daily Mail shared the "horrifying videos" from the Arena, as "terrified concert-goers flee for their lives",[17] while several newspapers emphasised the presence of children among the victims, as prime minister Theresa May condemned, in her statement, how the attacker saw a "room packed with young children as an opportunity for carnage".[18] Data from *LexisNexis* confirms the relevance of the Manchester Arena bombing in the public debate: it is indeed the most widely covered attack in the 2014-2019 period, with over 11,900 results for the first month after the event.[19]

London Bridge stabbing – Islamic extremism – 29th Novemeber 2019

On 29 November 2019, Usman Khan, a former British prisoner of Pakistani descent, convicted of terrorist offences, stabbed five people inside and outside Fishmongers' Hall, a

[11] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[12] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[13] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[14] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[15] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[16] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[17] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[18] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[19] The following keywords were utilized to identify the attack: (*"terrorist" OR "terrorism"*) *AND "Manchester" AND "arena"*.

building adjacent to London Bridge. Two of the victims died from their stab wounds.[20] Having been released on license just one year before,[21] Khan, on the day of the attack, was attending a conference on offender rehabilitation.[22] After initially threatening to detonate what turned out to be a fake suicide vest, he began stabbing people in the building.[23] Khan then ran outside and stabbed pedestrians on London Bridge, where a civilian eventually managed to block him, until the police arrived and shot him dead.[24]

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed – without evidence – that Khan was one of its followers.[25] As part of the inquest that followed the attack, considering Khan's early release, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, recommended in 2021 that those who participate in the planning or preparation of terrorist attacks are given automatic life sentences.[26] While the investigators concluded that the police had lawfully killed Khan,[27] a separate inquiry found that: (i) the attacker had not been sufficiently monitored; (ii) communication and data sharing between agencies was insufficient; and; (iii) the security planning at the event had been sub-par. These factors, the jury concluded, all contributed to the death of the two victims.[28]

[20] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[21] *Ibid*.
[22] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[23] *Ibid*.
[24] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[25] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[26] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[27] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).
[28] Available online (last accessed: 07/07/22).

B. Descriptives

- Figure B.1 presents a map with the location and key characteristics of the terrorist attacks used in the analysis.
- Figure B.2 provides examples of UK national newspaper front pages from the day after each far-right attack in the analysis. The top row is for the Jo Cox murder and the bottom row is for the Finsbury Park attack.
- Figure B.3 provides examples of UK national newspaper front pages from the day after each Islamic attack in the analysis. The top row is for the Manchester Arena attack and the bottom row is for the London Bridge stabbing.
- Table B.1 presents summary statistics and definitions for all variables used the baseline model (Eq. 1).
- Table B.2 performs balancing tests in observed characteristics across treatment and control units. This shows that there are differences in the mean of some covariates (e.g., age and employment status) across the two groups, but the magnitude of the difference is very small.

Figure B.1: Location and key characteristics of the four attacks

Notes: The size of each point reflects the total number of people killed or wounded as a result of that attack.

Figure B.2: Newspaper front pages from the day after far-right attacks

(a) Jo Cox MP murder

(b) Jo Cox MP murder

(c) Finsbury Park attack

(d) Finsbury Park attack

Figure B.3: Newspaper front pages from the day after Islamic attacks

(a) Manchester Arena attack

(b) Manchester Arena attack

(c) London Bridge stabbing

(d) London Bridge stabbing

Table B.1: Summary statistics

	Far-right attacks sample					Islamic attacks sample					
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Obs.	Definition
Affective Polarization	5.05	3.17	0.00	10.00	31,831	5.13	3.14	0.00	10.00	29,919	The absolute difference (distance) between the like-dislike scores for the Conservative party and the Labour party.
Post-attack	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is interviewed after a terrorist attack, 0 if they are interviewed before a terrorist attack, and 'missing' if they are interviewed on the same day as the attack
Age	52.78	15.92	16.00	93.00	31,831	54.63	15.71	18.00	97.00	29,919	The age of the respondent
Age sqr.	3038.91	1608.48	256.00	8649.00	31,831	3231.36	1635.01	324.00	9409.00	29,919	The age of the respondent squared
Female	0.52	0.50	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is female, 0 if the respondent is male
Employed	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is in full or part-time employment, 0 otherwise
Student/Other	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is a student or has 'other' labour market status, 0 otherwise
Retired	0.32	0.47	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is retired, 0 otherwise
Unemployed/Not working	0.10	0.31	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.10	0.29	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is unemployed or not currently working, 0 otherwise
Educ.: Below GCSE	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent's highest level of education is below GCSEs, 0 otherwise
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.40	0.49	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.38	0.49	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent's highest level of education is either GCSE, A-level or a Diploma, 0 otherwise
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.43	0.50	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent's highest level of education is a bachelor degree or above, 0 otherwise
Single	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is single, 0 otherwise
In a relationship	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.69	0.46	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondents is in any type of relationship, 0 otherwise
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.14	0.34	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondents is separated, divorced or widowed, 0 otherwise
1 or more child	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent has 1 or more children, 0 otherwise
White British	0.93	0.26	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.92	0.27	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent's ethnicity is white British, 0 otherwise
No religion	0.48	0.50	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent has no religious affiliation, 0 otherwise
Christian	0.45	0.50	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is Christian, 0 otherwise
Islamic	0.01	0.08	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent is Muslim, 0 otherwise
Other religion	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	31,831	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00	29,919	=1 if the respondent has a different reported religion, 0 otherwise

Table B.2: Covariate balance

	Far-right attacks sample				Islamic attacks sample			
	Mean (control)	Mean (treatment)	Diff.	p-value	Mean (control)	Mean (treatment)	Diff.	p-value
Age	52.98	51.99	0.99	0.00	54.30	54.97	-0.67	0.00
Age sqr.	3055.29	2973.56	81.73	0.00	3197.23	3265.86	-68.63	0.00
Female	0.52	0.52	-0.00	0.78	0.51	0.51	0.01	0.29
Employed	0.51	0.53	-0.02	0.03	0.50	0.50	-0.00	0.99
Student/Other	0.06	0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.00	0.20
Retired	0.32	0.31	0.02	0.01	0.35	0.36	-0.01	0.08
Unemployed/Not working	0.11	0.10	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.09	0.01	0.05
Educ.: Below GCSE	0.17	0.17	0.00	0.54	0.17	0.16	0.00	0.34
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.39	0.40	-0.01	0.22	0.38	0.39	-0.01	0.23
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.43	0.43	0.01	0.46	0.45	0.45	0.00	0.64
Single	0.17	0.17	-0.00	0.89	0.17	0.17	-0.00	0.86
In a relationship	0.69	0.70	-0.01	0.31	0.69	0.69	0.00	0.59
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.14	0.13	0.01	0.13	0.14	0.14	-0.00	0.60
1 or more child	0.19	0.21	-0.01	0.02	0.19	0.19	0.01	0.24
White British	0.92	0.93	-0.00	0.83	0.92	0.92	0.00	0.31
No religion	0.48	0.47	0.01	0.21	0.50	0.49	0.01	0.12
Christian	0.45	0.46	-0.01	0.18	0.44	0.44	0.00	0.97
Islamic	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.39	0.01	0.01	-0.00	0.04
Other religion	0.06	0.06	-0.00	0.92	0.06	0.06	-0.01	0.01
Observations	25,452	6,379	31,831		15,039	14,880	29,919	

Notes: This table shows the mean of covariates across treatment and control units, together with conventional t-tests for differences in means across the two groups, for the far-right attacks sample and the Islamic attacks sample.

C. Robustness Tests

C.1 Using a multiparty measure of affective polarization

In our main analysis, we capture polarization using the affective distance between the two largest parties (Conservatives and Labour). In this section, we assess the robustness of our results to using a measure that accounts for all parties in the UK's multiparty system and their size. Following Wagner (2021), we calculate this measure by the weighted average party affect difference compared to each respondent's weighted average party affect – based on the responses of individuals who declare a level of affect for at least two parties. The formula is as follows:

$$\textit{Multiparty Affective Polarization}_i = \sqrt{\sum_{p=1}^{P} v_p(\text{like}_{ip} - \overline{\text{like}_i})^2} \tag{C.1}$$

where v_p is the country-specific[29] vote share of each party in the most recent general election and $like_{ip}$ is the like-dislike score assigned to each party p by individual i. The mean affect itself is weighted by party size and is calculated by:

$$\overline{\text{like}_i} = \sum_{p=1}^{P}(v_p \times \text{like}_{ip}) \tag{C.2}$$

It should be stressed that the multiparty measure is highly correlated with our baseline (two-party) measure, with correlation coefficient equal to 0.51 (p-value < 0.01). This is also evidenced by Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2022) who show that the two alternative measures of affective polarization (for Great Britain) follow an identical trend over the period 1980 – 2019 (see Figure C.1a).

In Figure C.1b, we re-estimate our baseline model but we now use the multiparty measure as the outcome variable. Given the presence of large country-specific parties in Scotland and Wales (like the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru, the Party of Wales), we also check the sensitivity of our estimates when we restrict the sample to include only the respondents who reside in England. Overall, our inferences do not change: once again, we can see that terrorism causes significant changes in affective polarization and that the direction of the effect depends on the attack typology (in line with ***Hypothesis 2***).

[29] We use the party vote shares in the respondent's country of residence (England, Scotland or Wales).

Figure C.1a: Trends in affective polarization for Great Britain

(a) Multiparty measure



(b) Two-party measure

Notes: The figures are lifted from Boxell, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2022) Figure 1 and Figure 2.

Figure C.1b: Terrorism exposure and polarization: using a multiparty measure



Notes: The dependent variable is *Multiparty Affective Polarization*. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

C.2 Testing for pre-existing trends

To strengthen our causal inference, we test for the presence of pre-existing trends in the outcome variable. To do so, we consider placebo treatments at an arbitrary time point in the pre-attack period, as recommended by Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández (2020). We begin by defining the 'placebo control' group as individuals interviewed from 8 to 15 days before the actual attacks, and the 'placebo treatment' group as individuals interviewed from 7 to 1 days before the actual attacks. We continue by going further back in time and creating a series of placebo tests based on such 7-day bandwidths.[30] We then re-run the main regression set-up and report the results in Figure C.2. In all cases, the placebo treatments have no significant effect on *Affective Polarization*, confirming the absence of pre-existing trends.

[30]Note we are only able to do this (in a consistent manner) three times, since for some waves there are no data available 29 days before the attack.

Figure C.2: Terrorism exposure and polarization: placebo treatments



Notes: The dependent variable is *Affective Polarization*. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. The shaded areas around the solid vertical line denote the true control group (to the left) and the true treatment group (to the right). Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

C.3 Using a narrower bandwidth

In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results to using a 3-day bandwidth; that is, we restrict the sample of control and treated units to include individuals interviewed within 3 days before and 3 days after the attacks. As shown in Figure C.3, the estimated treatment effects are almost identical to those obtained in our baseline analysis (based on a 7-day bandwidth) – even though they are less precisely estimated due to the much smaller sample sizes (lower statistical power), which is one of the downsides of using narrower bandwidths (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2020).

Figure C.3: Terrorism exposure and polarization:
using a 3-day bandwidth



Notes: The dependent variable is *Affective Polarization*. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

C.4 Dealing with imbalance

To ensure that our results are not affected by covariate imbalances, we re-weight the sample through entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012), such that the distribution of covariates among control units matches the moment conditions (mean, variance and skewness) of the treated units. As shown in Figure C.4, this exercise produces estimates which are remarkably similar to the baseline ones and does not change our inferences.

Figure C.4: Terrorism exposure and polarization: entropy balancing



Notes: The dependent variable is *Affective Polarization*. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

C.5 Excluding regions

In Figure C.5, we run the main regressions for eleven different sub-samples; each time dropping all individuals who live in a specific government office region. Regardless of which sample is excluded, the *Post-attack* estimates retain their size and statistical significant (at the 5% level or higher) for both far-right and Islamic attacks.

Figure C.5: Terrorism exposure and polarization: excluding regions



Notes: The dependent variable is *Affective Polarization*. The text on the horizontal axis denotes the excluded government office region. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

C.6 Alternative error clustering

In this section, we experiment with an alternative clustering of standard errors: at the LAD-by-wave level rather than at the LAD level. As shown in Figure C.6, our results are not affected by the method used to correct the standard errors.

Figure C.6: Terrorism exposure and polarization:
alternative error clustering



Notes: The dependent variable is *Affective Polarization*. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at this level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

C.7 Using a binary outcome variable

In our main analysis, we use a continuous measure of affective polarization that takes values between 0 and 10. In Figure C.7, we check the sensitivity of our results to using a binary outcome variable that equals 1 for values above 5 (the median of the continuous measure), and 0 for values equal or below 5. In this way, we can ensure that our results are not exclusively driven by changes at the right end (or the left end) of the polarization variable. The estimated treatment effects point to the same conclusion: exposure to far-right terrorism induces a shift away from high values (>5) of affective polarization, whereas exposure to Islamic terrorism causes the opposite effect. Using back-of-the-envelope calculations (and relying on the 2020 population figures), the point estimates suggest that approximately 1.76 million fewer people (700 thousand more people) exhibit high values of affective polarization after a far-right (Islamic) attack than before that attack.

Figure C.7: Terrorism exposure and polarization:
using a binary outcome variable



Notes: The dependent variable is *Affective Polarization* (*Binary*). All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

C.8 The salience of other popular issues

In our main analysis, we show that individuals are significantly more likely to report terrorism as the most important issue facing the country after they are exposed to both far-right and Islamic attacks – even though the effects appear to be much stronger for the latter typology of attacks. In this section, we run the same analysis but we now consider the responses to four other popular issues facing the country: austerity, the economy, the environment and immigration. As can be seen in Figure C.8, the post-attack change in the probability of reporting one of these issues as the most important national problem is either zero or marginally negative (with a negative value indicating that terrorism sways public opinion away from this issue), and this applies to both far-right and Islamic attacks.

Figure C.8: Terrorism and other popular issues



Notes: The dependent variable is listed on the vertical axis. All specifications include LAD × wave fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level. Thick (thin) lines signify the 90% (95%) confidence interval.

D. Twitter Data Details

In this section, we detail the process of gathering the tweets, measuring sentiment, defining topics and analyzing the tweets we use in the main paper.

We use Twitter's API v2 to collect English language tweets from accounts of geo-located UK users 3 days before and 3 days after each of the four attacks in our sample. In total, we gather 4,815,353 tweets: 2,751,913 from the two far-right attacks and 2,063,440 from the two Islamic attacks. With these tweets we then allocate sentiment scores based on their content using NRC Emotion Lexicon (Mohammad and Turney, 2013). The NRC Emotion Lexicon is a list of words which are manually assigned to eight emotions (anger, fear, anticipation, trust, surprise, sadness, joy and disgust) and two sentiments (negative and positive). The tool is well adapted for the analysis of social media content given its ability to assign scores to emojis as well as text. Next, we use the Word2vec algorithm to identify the sample of tweets that pertain to certain topics. The algorithm uses a neural network model to learn word associations from a large corpus of text. In our case, we use a pre-trained algorithm that is trained on a Google News dataset (about 100 billion words). For a given input word, the trained model outputs synonymous words, or phrases, based on their cosine proximity. Our input words are 'immigration' and 'prime minister'. We use the top 50 most similar words, and the word itself, to identify tweets that discuss each of these topics. By doing so, we identify 6,879 (3,834) tweets that mention the topic 'immigration' and are posted around a far-right (Islamic) attack; and 6,111 (6,661) tweets that mention the topic 'prime minister' and are posted around a far-right (Islamic) attack. Finally, for the analysis in the main paper, we present the mean sentiment of the tweets for each topic before and after the two attack typologies. This is calculated using the share of words assigned to a given sentiment across all lexicon-identified words included in the immigration-related tweets or the prime-minister-related tweets.

E. Full Regression Results

This section shows the full list of regression estimates for the tables and figures included in the main paper and the *SI Appendix*. See Tables E.1 - E.6 and Tables E.7 - E.14 below, respectively.

Table E.1: Terrorism exposure and polarization: main results, full output

	Affective Polarization								
	All attacks			Far-right attacks			Islamic attacks		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Post-attack	0.007	-0.002	-0.001	-0.182***	-0.170***	-0.131***	0.113***	0.088***	0.063***
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.023)
Lagged affective polarization			0.810***			0.795***			0.828***
			(0.003)			(0.004)			(0.004)
Age		-0.049***	-0.021***		-0.043***	-0.021***		-0.052***	-0.020***
		(0.007)	(0.004)		(0.009)	(0.005)		(0.008)	(0.006)
Age sqr.		0.001***	0.000***		0.001***	0.000***		0.001***	0.000***
		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)		(0.000)	(0.000)
Female		0.060*	0.064***		0.144***	0.121***		-0.030	-0.008
		(0.031)	(0.017)		(0.038)	(0.025)		(0.038)	(0.025)
Student/Other		0.425***	0.138***		0.433***	0.108**		0.409***	0.178***
		(0.074)	(0.042)		(0.086)	(0.053)		(0.097)	(0.062)
Retired		0.095*	-0.025		0.039	-0.038		0.157**	-0.009
		(0.050)	(0.028)		(0.061)	(0.042)		(0.062)	(0.040)
Unemployed/Not working		0.244***	0.098***		0.326***	0.080*		0.144*	0.125***
		(0.058)	(0.030)		(0.064)	(0.044)		(0.074)	(0.044)
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma		0.054	0.007		0.118**	-0.007		-0.020	0.026
		(0.048)	(0.027)		(0.059)	(0.038)		(0.057)	(0.039)
Educ.: Bachelor or higher		0.086*	0.011		0.201***	0.039		-0.041	-0.019
		(0.050)	(0.027)		(0.061)	(0.038)		(0.059)	(0.040)
In a relationship		0.057	-0.018		0.015	-0.020		0.104*	-0.018
		(0.044)	(0.024)		(0.058)	(0.038)		(0.055)	(0.040)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed		0.047	0.009		0.058	0.051		0.039	-0.042
		(0.059)	(0.033)		(0.071)	(0.049)		(0.078)	(0.051)
1 or more child		-0.118***	0.054**		-0.101*	0.054		-0.138**	0.052
		(0.044)	(0.025)		(0.054)	(0.037)		(0.055)	(0.036)
White British		0.348***	0.058*		0.353***	0.065		0.340***	0.052
		(0.065)	(0.034)		(0.076)	(0.050)		(0.078)	(0.051)
Christian		-0.113***	-0.100***		-0.179***	-0.099***		-0.042	-0.103***
		(0.036)	(0.019)		(0.043)	(0.027)		(0.043)	(0.026)
Islamic		0.338*	0.315***		0.658***	0.644***		-0.005	-0.060
		(0.179)	(0.104)		(0.218)	(0.157)		(0.231)	(0.137)
Other religion		-0.011	0.029		0.027	-0.002		-0.055	0.067
		(0.066)	(0.041)		(0.085)	(0.055)		(0.090)	(0.058)
Constant	5.086***	5.173***	1.547***	5.091***	5.026***	1.703***	5.068***	5.246***	1.302***
	(0.010)	(0.189)	(0.097)	(0.010)	(0.220)	(0.138)	(0.016)	(0.229)	(0.150)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370
R-squared	0.044	0.059	0.667	0.051	0.063	0.647	0.036	0.059	0.694
Observations	64,378	61,750	45,491	33,175	31,831	25,081	31,203	29,919	20,410

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.2: Terrorism exposure and polarization: by attack, full output

	Affective Polarization											
	Far-right attacks		Jo Cox MP murder		Finsbury Park attack		Islamic attacks		Manchester Arena bombing		London Bridge stabbing	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post-attack	-0.170***	-0.182***	-0.182***	-0.167**	-0.169**	-0.197***	0.088***	0.113***	0.080	0.136**	0.091*	0.097**
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Age	-0.043***		-0.000		-0.058***		-0.052***		-0.032**		-0.066***	
	(0.009)		(0.015)		(0.010)		(0.008)		(0.013)		(0.010)	
Age sqr.	0.001***		0.000		0.001***		0.001***		0.001***		0.001***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.144***		0.080		0.165***		-0.030		0.002		-0.055	
	(0.038)		(0.069)		(0.041)		(0.038)		(0.055)		(0.049)	
Student/Other	0.433***		0.142		0.535***		0.409***		0.647***		0.219*	
	(0.086)		(0.164)		(0.095)		(0.097)		(0.138)		(0.122)	
Retired	0.039		-0.032		0.065		0.157**		0.149		0.164**	
	(0.061)		(0.103)		(0.071)		(0.062)		(0.099)		(0.077)	
Unemployed/Not working	0.326***		0.244**		0.355***		0.144*		0.165		0.127	
	(0.064)		(0.118)		(0.070)		(0.074)		(0.101)		(0.097)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.118**		0.138		0.111		-0.020		0.128		-0.130*	
	(0.059)		(0.099)		(0.069)		(0.057)		(0.085)		(0.072)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.201***		0.314***		0.160**		-0.041		0.087		-0.138*	
	(0.061)		(0.101)		(0.067)		(0.059)		(0.085)		(0.074)	
In a relationship	0.015		-0.009		0.021		0.104*		0.093		0.114	
	(0.058)		(0.100)		(0.062)		(0.055)		(0.080)		(0.074)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.058		0.067		0.049		0.039		0.150		-0.039	
	(0.071)		(0.135)		(0.079)		(0.078)		(0.109)		(0.096)	
1 or more child	-0.101*		-0.119		-0.091		-0.138**		-0.172**		-0.116	
	(0.054)		(0.093)		(0.062)		(0.055)		(0.076)		(0.072)	
White British	0.353***		0.443***		0.324***		0.340***		0.229**		0.411***	
	(0.076)		(0.140)		(0.085)		(0.078)		(0.114)		(0.093)	
Christian	-0.179***		-0.204***		-0.169***		-0.042		-0.134**		0.028	
	(0.043)		(0.071)		(0.046)		(0.043)		(0.062)		(0.055)	
Islamic	0.658***		0.492		0.696***		-0.005		-0.490		0.343	
	(0.218)		(0.518)		(0.226)		(0.231)		(0.403)		(0.299)	
Other religion	0.027		-0.090		0.070		-0.055		-0.061		-0.051	
	(0.085)		(0.142)		(0.095)		(0.090)		(0.117)		(0.119)	
Constant	5.026***	5.091***	3.218***	4.422***	5.682***	5.342***	5.246***	5.068***	4.574***	4.887***	5.732***	5.200***
	(0.220)	(0.010)	(0.357)	(0.031)	(0.240)	(0.007)	(0.229)	(0.016)	(0.330)	(0.027)	(0.262)	(0.023)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	369	369	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370
R-squared	0.063	0.051	0.076	0.059	0.037	0.025	0.059	0.036	0.059	0.038	0.056	0.032
Observations	31831	33175	8772	9089	23059	24086	29919	31203	12624	13234	17295	17969

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.3: Terrorism as the most important issue: full output

	Affective Polarization			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-attack	0.042***	0.047***	0.235***	0.238***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Age	0.001		0.000	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Age sqr.	-0.000***		-0.000	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.058***		0.081***	
	(0.004)		(0.006)	
Student/Other	-0.039***		-0.032**	
	(0.008)		(0.014)	
Retired	-0.014***		-0.014	
	(0.005)		(0.010)	
Unemployed/Not working	-0.006		0.010	
	(0.007)		(0.011)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	-0.015***		-0.014	
	(0.006)		(0.010)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	-0.059***		-0.074***	
	(0.005)		(0.010)	
In a relationship	0.010**		0.013	
	(0.005)		(0.009)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.024***		0.003	
	(0.007)		(0.012)	
1 or more child	0.033***		0.016*	
	(0.006)		(0.009)	
White British	0.023***		0.010	
	(0.006)		(0.012)	
Christian	0.027***		0.044***	
	(0.003)		(0.006)	
Islamic	-0.044**		-0.043	
	(0.020)		(0.038)	
Other religion	0.019**		0.012	
	(0.007)		(0.014)	
Constant	0.078***	0.086***	0.001	0.026***
	(0.019)	(0.001)	(0.037)	(0.003)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370
R-squared	0.078	0.047	0.179	0.150
Observations	29901	31063	12015	12563

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.4: Far-right terrorism exposure and immigration attitudes: full output

	Far-right attacks					
	Allow More Immigrants		Immigration Enriches Cultural Life		Immigration Good for the Economy	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Post-attack	0.174***	0.188***	0.096***	0.123***	0.105***	0.120***
	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)
Age	-0.092***		-0.071***		-0.069***	
	(0.014)		(0.005)		(0.005)	
Age sqr.	0.001***		0.001***		0.001***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.007		0.168***		-0.155***	
	(0.058)		(0.024)		(0.022)	
Student/Other	0.519***		0.199***		0.200***	
	(0.132)		(0.050)		(0.045)	
Retired	0.141		0.032		0.077**	
	(0.098)		(0.040)		(0.034)	
Unemployed/Not working	-0.116		-0.115***		-0.095***	
	(0.101)		(0.038)		(0.036)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.535***		0.406***		0.432***	
	(0.073)		(0.035)		(0.033)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	1.634***		1.089***		1.094***	
	(0.078)		(0.037)		(0.034)	
In a relationship	-0.006		-0.040		-0.005	
	(0.098)		(0.035)		(0.031)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	-0.073		-0.067		-0.038	
	(0.130)		(0.044)		(0.040)	
1 or more child	-0.199**		-0.113***		-0.161***	
	(0.084)		(0.033)		(0.029)	
White British	-0.993***		-0.745***		-0.623***	
	(0.134)		(0.050)		(0.045)	
Christian	-0.692***		-0.490***		-0.372***	
	(0.059)		(0.026)		(0.023)	
Islamic	0.466		0.156		-0.022	
	(0.466)		(0.154)		(0.154)	
Other religion	-0.214		-0.161***		-0.168***	
	(0.131)		(0.049)		(0.046)	
Constant	6.283***	3.054***	6.167***	3.820***	6.344***	4.230***
	(0.339)	(0.029)	(0.141)	(0.006)	(0.123)	(0.005)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	369	369	370	370	370	370
R-squared	0.235	0.115	0.178	0.067	0.182	0.078
Observations	9335	9661	31564	32836	31272	32554

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.5: Terrorism exposure and support for the 'far-right': full output

	Prob. of voting UKIP				Like UKIP				Like Nigel Farage			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post-attack	-0.097	-0.140**	0.169**	0.209***	-0.083*	-0.118**	0.035	0.042	-0.220***	-0.224***	0.063	0.081
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.051)	(0.052)
Age	0.049***		0.024		0.041***		0.018**		0.052***		0.040***	
	(0.009)		(0.015)		(0.009)		(0.008)		(0.016)		(0.010)	
Age sqr.	-0.000***		-0.000		-0.000**		-0.000		-0.000**		-0.000	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	-0.423***		-0.271***		-0.333***		-0.140***		-0.668***		-0.638***	
	(0.042)		(0.069)		(0.038)		(0.030)		(0.071)		(0.051)	
Student/Other	-0.134		-0.375**		-0.214***		-0.254***		-0.263*		-0.039	
	(0.088)		(0.161)		(0.077)		(0.070)		(0.153)		(0.116)	
Retired	-0.066		-0.099		-0.078		-0.136**		-0.004		0.007	
	(0.073)		(0.130)		(0.066)		(0.056)		(0.121)		(0.090)	
Unemployed/Not working	0.171**		0.160		0.096		0.118*		-0.013		0.188**	
	(0.073)		(0.124)		(0.064)		(0.061)		(0.132)		(0.091)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	-0.702***		-0.652***		-0.671***		-0.615***		-0.685***		-0.766***	
	(0.071)		(0.117)		(0.060)		(0.052)		(0.110)		(0.079)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	-1.520***		-1.307***		-1.593***		-1.441***		-1.707***		-1.646***	
	(0.069)		(0.122)		(0.060)		(0.050)		(0.110)		(0.082)	
In a relationship	0.084		0.002		0.059		0.055		0.127		0.063	
	(0.058)		(0.104)		(0.050)		(0.048)		(0.089)		(0.075)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.049		-0.014		0.042		0.071		0.098		-0.052	
	(0.081)		(0.149)		(0.071)		(0.067)		(0.132)		(0.100)	
1 or more child	0.136**		0.155		0.211***		0.169***		0.277***		0.097	
	(0.054)		(0.103)		(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.099)		(0.067)	
White British	0.555***		0.467***		0.594***		0.378***		0.588***		0.662***	
	(0.071)		(0.106)		(0.065)		(0.055)		(0.128)		(0.084)	
Christian	0.666***		0.584***		0.800***		0.686***		0.856***		0.898***	
	(0.048)		(0.075)		(0.042)		(0.036)		(0.074)		(0.056)	
Islamic	-0.190		-0.405		-0.416**		0.101		0.108		0.040	
	(0.211)		(0.320)		(0.201)		(0.167)		(0.451)		(0.309)	
Other religion	0.299***		0.415***		0.331***		0.271***		0.268*		0.288**	
	(0.083)		(0.155)		(0.073)		(0.066)		(0.148)		(0.112)	
Constant	0.858***	2.159***	0.962***	1.599***	1.240***	2.631***	1.409***	2.045***	2.028***	3.508***	1.410***	3.071***
	(0.222)	(0.008)	(0.370)	(0.037)	(0.219)	(0.009)	(0.199)	(0.016)	(0.393)	(0.032)	(0.274)	(0.026)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	368	370	370	370	370	370	369	369	370	370
R-squared	0.131	0.074	0.183	0.131	0.165	0.082	0.141	0.067	0.168	0.082	0.158	0.057
Observations	25435	26568	7454	7770	31670	32990	29517	30786	8761	9075	17415	18109

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.6: Terrorism exposure and support for the incumbent: full output

	Like Prime Minister											
	All supporters				Conservative supporters				Labour supporters			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post-attack	0.047	0.009	-0.122***	-0.093**	-0.043	0.009	-0.042	-0.093**	0.070	0.009	-0.197***	-0.093**
	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.069)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.065)	(0.047)	(0.071)	(0.039)
Age	-0.026***		0.006		-0.031**		-0.011		-0.011		0.020	
	(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.012)		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.015)	
Age sqr.	0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000**		0.000		-0.000	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.181***		-0.126***		0.509***		0.010		0.016		0.005	
	(0.039)		(0.042)		(0.051)		(0.051)		(0.050)		(0.063)	
Student/Other	-0.662***		-0.551***		-0.343**		0.232		-0.318***		-0.421***	
	(0.076)		(0.093)		(0.166)		(0.205)		(0.104)		(0.135)	
Retired	-0.077		-0.023		-0.025		0.206***		0.028		-0.261**	
	(0.059)		(0.069)		(0.072)		(0.077)		(0.093)		(0.128)	
Unemployed/Not working	-0.639***		-0.313***		0.050		0.211*		-0.312***		-0.265**	
	(0.066)		(0.075)		(0.111)		(0.113)		(0.082)		(0.124)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.037		-0.384***		-0.165**		-0.374***		-0.165*		-0.677***	
	(0.055)		(0.062)		(0.073)		(0.066)		(0.093)		(0.114)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	-0.292***		-1.162***		-0.443***		-0.718***		-0.354***		-1.187***	
	(0.056)		(0.064)		(0.075)		(0.072)		(0.090)		(0.108)	
In a relationship	0.229***		0.158***		-0.007		-0.065		0.184***		0.087	
	(0.054)		(0.061)		(0.086)		(0.091)		(0.063)		(0.084)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	-0.073		-0.069		-0.052		-0.249**		0.063		-0.014	
	(0.076)		(0.084)		(0.107)		(0.113)		(0.088)		(0.120)	
1 or more child	-0.003		0.070		0.047		0.046		0.090		0.156*	
	(0.049)		(0.057)		(0.073)		(0.085)		(0.066)		(0.085)	
White British	0.389***		0.827***		0.046		0.554***		-0.190*		0.069	
	(0.074)		(0.077)		(0.141)		(0.160)		(0.101)		(0.114)	
Christian	1.199***		1.376***		0.386***		0.366***		0.786***		1.000***	
	(0.040)		(0.046)		(0.054)		(0.054)		(0.056)		(0.074)	
Islamic	0.521**		0.705***		0.278		-0.523		0.555***		0.564*	
	(0.211)		(0.261)		(0.635)		(0.515)		(0.209)		(0.294)	
Other religion	0.354***		0.475***		0.272**		0.201		0.058		0.082	
	(0.089)		(0.097)		(0.134)		(0.135)		(0.107)		(0.129)	
Constant	2.702***	3.739***	2.511***	4.441***	6.709***	3.739***	6.900***	4.441***	2.089***	3.739***	1.875***	4.441***
	(0.197)	(0.010)	(0.229)	(0.020)	(0.347)	(0.010)	(0.363)	(0.020)	(0.267)	(0.010)	(0.350)	(0.020)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370	367	370	368	370	367	370	366	370
R-squared	0.136	0.060	0.187	0.077	0.153	0.060	0.141	0.077	0.112	0.060	0.196	0.077
Observations	31992	33345	30239	31585	9224	33345	9121	31585	9901	33345	7947	31585

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.7: Terrorism exposure and polarization: using a multiparty measure, full output

	Multiparty Affective Polarization							
	Whole sample				England only sample			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Post-attack	-0.080***	-0.088***	0.019	0.030**	-0.078***	-0.089***	0.027*	0.037**
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Age	-0.014***		-0.014***		-0.018***		-0.018***	
	(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.004)	
Age sqr.	0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.024		-0.059***		0.034**		-0.051***	
	(0.015)		(0.016)		(0.017)		(0.017)	
Student/Other	0.199***		0.200***		0.176***		0.198***	
	(0.033)		(0.040)		(0.038)		(0.047)	
Retired	0.032		0.078***		0.011		0.101***	
	(0.026)		(0.025)		(0.031)		(0.028)	
Unemployed/Not working	0.165***		0.076***		0.176***		0.094***	
	(0.026)		(0.029)		(0.029)		(0.032)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.006		-0.023		0.004		-0.022	
	(0.025)		(0.024)		(0.028)		(0.027)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.046*		-0.004		0.045		-0.012	
	(0.025)		(0.025)		(0.029)		(0.028)	
In a relationship	0.010		0.051**		0.006		0.064**	
	(0.023)		(0.023)		(0.027)		(0.026)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.018		0.026		0.015		0.007	
	(0.029)		(0.034)		(0.033)		(0.038)	
1 or more child	-0.031		-0.074***		-0.021		-0.060**	
	(0.022)		(0.023)		(0.026)		(0.024)	
White British	0.104***		0.075**		0.120***		0.116***	
	(0.031)		(0.035)		(0.034)		(0.036)	
Christian	-0.070***		-0.030*		-0.074***		-0.033*	
	(0.017)		(0.017)		(0.020)		(0.020)	
Islamic	0.287***		-0.095		0.280***		-0.051	
	(0.092)		(0.101)		(0.095)		(0.104)	
Other religion	0.001		-0.014		-0.009		-0.033	
	(0.036)		(0.036)		(0.040)		(0.040)	
Constant	2.719***	2.777***	2.662***	2.735***	2.767***	2.740***	2.668***	2.700***
	(0.089)	(0.004)	(0.088)	(0.007)	(0.100)	(0.004)	(0.099)	(0.007)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370	316	316	316	316
R-squared	0.048	0.035	0.062	0.035	0.044	0.031	0.062	0.033
Observations	32126	33503	30217	31539	25706	26879	24689	25820

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.8: Terrorism exposure and polarization: placebo treatments, full output

	Affective Polarization											
	Far-right attacks						Islamic attacks					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Placebo post-attack (-8 days)	0.066	0.080					0.052	0.044				
	(0.060)	(0.062)					(0.036)	(0.036)				
Placebo post-attack (-15 days)			-0.063	-0.070					-0.133	-0.069		
			(0.045)	(0.047)					(0.085)	(0.088)		
Placebo post-attack (-22 days)					-0.022	0.001					-0.042	-0.018
					(0.043)	(0.044)					(0.030)	(0.030)
Age		-0.034***		-0.009		-0.019*		-0.037***		-0.010		-0.035***
		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.009)		(0.016)		(0.006)
Age sqr.		0.000***		0.000**		0.000***		0.001***		0.000***		0.001***
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Female		0.129***		0.132***		0.097**		0.010		0.022		-0.027
		(0.041)		(0.048)		(0.044)		(0.042)		(0.076)		(0.032)
Student/Other		0.429***		0.302***		0.550***		0.428***		0.346*		0.343***
		(0.089)		(0.108)		(0.113)		(0.083)		(0.177)		(0.069)
Retired		0.037		0.017		0.086		0.094		0.009		0.185***
		(0.065)		(0.084)		(0.071)		(0.060)		(0.111)		(0.046)
Unemployed/Not working		0.300***		0.149*		0.223***		0.172**		0.251*		0.161***
		(0.068)		(0.086)		(0.079)		(0.077)		(0.140)		(0.056)
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma		0.119**		0.141**		0.111*		-0.017		0.017		-0.023
		(0.060)		(0.068)		(0.067)		(0.060)		(0.116)		(0.044)
Educ.: Bachelor or higher		0.186***		0.237***		0.172**		-0.047		0.023		-0.113**
		(0.061)		(0.070)		(0.067)		(0.059)		(0.116)		(0.047)
In a relationship		-0.045		-0.075		0.063		0.107*		0.022		0.071*
		(0.058)		(0.072)		(0.061)		(0.058)		(0.109)		(0.040)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed		0.059		0.018		0.165*		-0.040		-0.172		0.019
		(0.075)		(0.104)		(0.086)		(0.077)		(0.152)		(0.059)
1 or more child		-0.101*		-0.069		-0.136**		-0.161***		-0.181		-0.167***
		(0.056)		(0.067)		(0.061)		(0.052)		(0.111)		(0.041)
White British		0.356***		0.450***		0.349***		0.458***		0.579***		0.452***
		(0.081)		(0.100)		(0.094)		(0.076)		(0.147)		(0.059)
Christian		-0.142***		-0.017		-0.108**		0.057		0.098		0.070**
		(0.044)		(0.050)		(0.047)		(0.044)		(0.077)		(0.032)
Islamic		0.639***		0.120		-0.189		0.055		-0.132		0.341**
		(0.233)		(0.279)		(0.295)		(0.253)		(0.421)		(0.165)
Other religion		-0.054		-0.105		-0.094		-0.104		-0.106		-0.022
		(0.082)		(0.100)		(0.092)		(0.086)		(0.146)		(0.064)
Constant	4.997***	4.777***	4.746***	3.806***	4.804***	4.099***	5.014***	4.525***	5.066***	3.627***	4.924***	4.490***
	(0.050)	(0.230)	(0.018)	(0.273)	(0.023)	(0.271)	(0.018)	(0.238)	(0.068)	(0.411)	(0.009)	(0.166)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	369	369	370	370
R-squared	0.051	0.062	0.057	0.069	0.047	0.063	0.037	0.065	0.057	0.091	0.025	0.055
Observations	31563	30321	19659	18749	23050	21975	31081	29818	8279	7895	55001	52474

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.9: Terrorism exposure and polarization: using a narrower bandwidth, full output

	Affective Polarization			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-attack (3-day)	-0.121*	-0.144**	0.089	0.103*
	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.055)
Age	-0.037***		-0.047***	
	(0.014)		(0.012)	
Age sqr.	0.001***		0.001***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.192***		-0.042	
	(0.069)		(0.059)	
Student/Other	0.335**		0.160	
	(0.151)		(0.149)	
Retired	0.029		0.095	
	(0.108)		(0.094)	
Unemployed/Not working	0.328***		0.037	
	(0.123)		(0.106)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.105		0.100	
	(0.100)		(0.097)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.241**		0.156*	
	(0.103)		(0.094)	
In a relationship	0.065		0.100	
	(0.097)		(0.084)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.052		-0.064	
	(0.140)		(0.116)	
1 or more child	-0.072		-0.171**	
	(0.092)		(0.081)	
White British	0.464***		0.412***	
	(0.131)		(0.117)	
Christian	-0.194**		-0.092	
	(0.076)		(0.062)	
Islamic	0.269		0.130	
	(0.434)		(0.388)	
Other religion	-0.228		-0.122	
	(0.149)		(0.129)	
Constant	4.587***	4.942***	4.887***	5.056***
	(0.356)	(0.023)	(0.324)	(0.027)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	632	632	632	632
R-squared	0.154	0.140	0.126	0.102
Observations	10582	11069	13066	13635

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.10: Terrorism exposure and polarization: entropy balancing, full output

	Affective Polarization			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-attack	-0.169***	-0.177***	0.087***	0.088***
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Age	-0.042***		-0.053***	
	(0.010)		(0.008)	
Age sqr.	0.001***		0.001***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.166***		-0.031	
	(0.043)		(0.038)	
Student/Other	0.373***		0.411***	
	(0.099)		(0.098)	
Retired	0.027		0.152**	
	(0.070)		(0.062)	
Unemployed/Not working	0.313***		0.136*	
	(0.077)		(0.074)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.192***		-0.024	
	(0.069)		(0.057)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.266***		-0.047	
	(0.072)		(0.059)	
In a relationship	0.042		0.098*	
	(0.068)		(0.055)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.011		0.034	
	(0.086)		(0.078)	
1 or more child	-0.129**		-0.136**	
	(0.063)		(0.056)	
White British	0.388***		0.338***	
	(0.089)		(0.078)	
Christian	-0.194***		-0.039	
	(0.048)		(0.043)	
Islamic	0.608*		-0.041	
	(0.318)		(0.234)	
Other religion	0.094		-0.064	
	(0.107)		(0.090)	
Constant	4.767***	4.963***	5.265***	5.092***
	(0.251)	(0.027)	(0.229)	(0.017)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370
R-squared	0.085	0.073	0.058	0.037
Observations	31831	31831	29919	29919

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.11: Terrorism exposure and polarization: excluding regions (far-right attacks), full output

	Affective Polarization											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post-attack	-0.170***	-0.173***	-0.190***	-0.153***	-0.178***	-0.153***	-0.180***	-0.148***	-0.156***	-0.186***	-0.157***	-0.193***
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.056)
Age	-0.043***	-0.042***	-0.045***	-0.038***	-0.046***	-0.042***	-0.047***	-0.043***	-0.044***	-0.041***	-0.043***	-0.038***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age sqr.	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	0.144***	0.138***	0.162***	0.153***	0.141***	0.154***	0.155***	0.129***	0.136***	0.125***	0.140***	0.149***
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Student/Other	0.433***	0.431***	0.414***	0.428***	0.449***	0.426***	0.422***	0.496***	0.450***	0.416***	0.388***	0.444***
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Retired	0.039	0.017	0.046	0.057	0.061	0.013	0.032	0.048	0.066	0.041	0.021	0.036
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.069)
Unemployed/Not working	0.326***	0.324***	0.294***	0.330***	0.335***	0.295***	0.305***	0.311***	0.337***	0.341***	0.332***	0.388***
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.066)
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.118**	0.112*	0.104	0.120*	0.108*	0.100	0.119*	0.131**	0.109*	0.165***	0.099	0.127*
	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.065)
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.201***	0.192***	0.207***	0.179***	0.175***	0.189***	0.227***	0.202***	0.200***	0.248***	0.185***	0.211***
	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.061)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.067)
In a relationship	0.015	0.018	0.046	0.018	0.008	-0.001	0.029	-0.010	-0.016	0.063	0.016	-0.009
	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.062)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.062)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.058	0.081	0.075	0.027	0.055	0.043	0.079	0.031	0.070	0.082	0.051	0.038
	(0.071)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.075)	(0.073)	(0.077)
1 or more child	-0.101*	-0.100*	-0.115**	-0.128**	-0.085	-0.117**	-0.119**	-0.071	-0.079	-0.133**	-0.087	-0.076
	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.059)
White British	0.353***	0.341***	0.363***	0.353***	0.343***	0.374***	0.370***	0.350***	0.349***	0.376***	0.343***	0.319***
	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.091)	(0.082)	(0.079)	(0.078)	(0.082)
Christian	-0.179***	-0.174***	-0.181***	-0.180***	-0.194***	-0.176***	-0.202***	-0.149***	-0.160***	-0.171***	-0.176***	-0.206***
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.046)
Islamic	0.658***	0.639***	0.723***	0.622***	0.598***	0.695***	0.732***	0.797***	0.594**	0.716***	0.598***	0.564***
	(0.218)	(0.218)	(0.247)	(0.240)	(0.221)	(0.245)	(0.221)	(0.255)	(0.230)	(0.215)	(0.216)	(0.216)
Other religion	0.027	0.001	0.046	0.011	0.005	0.023	0.047	0.057	0.040	0.055	0.013	0.005
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.088)	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.089)
Constant	5.026***	4.993***	4.988***	4.904***	5.150***	5.005***	5.128***	5.018***	5.093***	4.930***	5.064***	5.013***
	(0.220)	(0.229)	(0.234)	(0.226)	(0.224)	(0.228)	(0.224)	(0.234)	(0.237)	(0.236)	(0.230)	(0.231)
Excluded region	None	N-E	N-W	York/Hum.	E-Midl.	W-Mdl.	E-Engl.	London	S-E	S-W	Wales	Scot.
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	358	331	349	330	340	325	337	303	341	348	338
R-squared	0.063	0.064	0.062	0.065	0.063	0.065	0.063	0.065	0.063	0.065	0.062	0.057
Observations	31831	30486	28596	29149	29495	29495	28914	28439	27486	28956	29524	27770

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.12: Terrorism exposure and polarization: excluding regions (Islamic attacks), full output

	Affective Polarization											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Post-attack	0.088***	0.085**	0.077**	0.092***	0.084**	0.075**	0.087**	0.103***	0.109***	0.072**	0.094***	0.093***
	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Age	-0.052***	-0.048***	-0.056***	-0.051***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.059***	-0.049***	-0.057***	-0.051***	-0.054***	-0.048***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Age sqr.	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.030	-0.022	-0.025	-0.043	-0.029	-0.035	-0.010	-0.036	-0.031	-0.039	-0.047	-0.016
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.041)
Student/Other	0.409***	0.402***	0.371***	0.383***	0.421***	0.436***	0.367***	0.457***	0.381***	0.439***	0.401***	0.444***
	(0.097)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.096)	(0.099)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.106)
Retired	0.157**	0.147**	0.162**	0.138**	0.154**	0.157**	0.127**	0.173***	0.153**	0.160**	0.184***	0.169**
	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.063)	(0.068)
Unemployed/Not working	0.144*	0.127*	0.095	0.132*	0.155**	0.119	0.135*	0.154*	0.175**	0.141*	0.163**	0.194**
	(0.074)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.075)	(0.078)	(0.076)
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	-0.020	-0.031	-0.042	-0.023	-0.011	-0.026	-0.008	-0.016	-0.011	0.017	-0.031	-0.037
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.060)
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	-0.041	-0.053	-0.061	-0.057	-0.028	-0.052	-0.019	-0.016	-0.017	-0.019	-0.046	-0.080
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.061)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.063)
In a relationship	0.104*	0.107*	0.106*	0.082	0.107*	0.092	0.106*	0.113*	0.097	0.105*	0.110*	0.116*
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.060)
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.039	0.051	0.021	0.049	0.070	0.032	-0.023	0.011	0.097	0.059	0.031	0.032
	(0.078)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.085)
1 or more child	-0.138**	-0.145**	-0.167***	-0.128**	-0.128**	-0.148**	-0.153***	-0.115*	-0.146**	-0.145**	-0.115**	-0.132**
	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.060)
White British	0.340***	0.335***	0.337***	0.338***	0.363***	0.329***	0.347***	0.368***	0.319***	0.350***	0.329***	0.337***
	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.084)	(0.079)	(0.079)	(0.085)
Christian	-0.042	-0.047	-0.047	-0.007	-0.035	-0.034	-0.074*	-0.043	-0.034	-0.046	-0.051	-0.045
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.047)
Islamic	-0.005	-0.003	-0.065	-0.078	0.040	-0.039	0.053	0.128	-0.088	0.001	-0.038	0.055
	(0.231)	(0.232)	(0.242)	(0.249)	(0.237)	(0.250)	(0.236)	(0.282)	(0.246)	(0.233)	(0.233)	(0.240)
Other religion	-0.055	-0.069	-0.049	-0.063	-0.041	-0.050	-0.080	-0.020	-0.078	-0.047	-0.069	-0.037
	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.092)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.095)	(0.095)	(0.092)	(0.094)
Constant	5.246***	5.140***	5.326***	5.223***	5.250***	5.258***	5.383***	5.057***	5.372***	5.183***	5.305***	5.210***
	(0.229)	(0.232)	(0.245)	(0.243)	(0.238)	(0.237)	(0.241)	(0.249)	(0.243)	(0.241)	(0.236)	(0.236)
Excluded region	None	N-E	N-W	York/Hum.	E-Midl.	W-Mdl.	E-Engl.	London	S-E	S-W	Wales	Scot.
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	358	331	349	330	340	325	337	303	341	348	338
R-squared	0.059	0.059	0.059	0.061	0.058	0.058	0.057	0.060	0.057	0.059	0.059	0.055
Observations	29919	28664	26969	27418	27630	27592	27065	26791	25651	27062	27870	26478

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.13: Terrorism exposure and polarization: using a binary outcome variable, full output

	Affective Polarization (Binary)			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Post-attack	-0.024***	-0.024***	0.009*	0.012**
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Age	-0.006***		-0.008***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)	
Age sqr.	0.000***		0.000***	
	(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.028***		0.013**	
	(0.006)		(0.006)	
Student/Other	0.039***		0.051***	
	(0.012)		(0.014)	
Retired	0.011		0.021**	
	(0.010)		(0.010)	
Unemployed/Not working	0.053***		0.020*	
	(0.010)		(0.011)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.009		-0.004	
	(0.008)		(0.008)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.013		-0.012	
	(0.008)		(0.009)	
In a relationship	-0.001		0.009	
	(0.009)		(0.009)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	-0.001		0.001	
	(0.011)		(0.012)	
1 or more child	-0.011		-0.010	
	(0.008)		(0.009)	
White British	0.028**		0.032***	
	(0.011)		(0.012)	
Christian	-0.034***		-0.025***	
	(0.006)		(0.006)	
Islamic	0.044		-0.010	
	(0.035)		(0.034)	
Other religion	0.021*		0.010	
	(0.012)		(0.013)	
Constant	0.644***	0.588***	0.679***	0.594***
	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.032)	(0.003)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	632	632	632	632
R-squared	0.061	0.053	0.060	0.047
Observations	33290	34822	31384	32918

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

Table E.14: Terrorism and other popular issues, full output

Most important issue:	Austerity				Economy				Environment				Immigration			
	Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks		Far-right attacks		Islamic attacks	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Post-attack	0.004	0.005	0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.004	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	-0.017***	-0.019***	-0.006	-0.006
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Age	0.001		0.001		0.001		0.001		-0.002***		-0.000		0.006***		0.004***	
	(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.000)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)	
Age sqr.	-0.000**		-0.000		-0.000		-0.000		0.000***		0.000		-0.000***		-0.000**	
	(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)	
Female	0.003		0.005		-0.027***		-0.030***		-0.004**		-0.003		-0.002		-0.011**	
	(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.005)	
Student/Other	0.019***		-0.007		-0.011*		-0.014		0.012***		0.007		-0.003		-0.020*	
	(0.006)		(0.007)		(0.006)		(0.011)		(0.004)		(0.006)		(0.008)		(0.010)	
Retired	0.006**		0.002		-0.011**		-0.005		-0.003		-0.001		-0.015**		-0.001	
	(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.007)		(0.010)	
Unemployed/Not working	0.005		0.010		-0.004		-0.004		-0.001		0.001		0.014*		0.003	
	(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.007)		(0.010)	
Educ.: GCSE/A-level/Diploma	0.000		-0.004		0.014***		0.016**		0.004***		-0.000		-0.050***		-0.053***	
	(0.002)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.001)		(0.002)		(0.007)		(0.010)	
Educ.: Bachelor or higher	0.012***		0.004		0.034***		0.028***		0.009***		0.013***		-0.119***		-0.112***	
	(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.007)		(0.010)	
In a relationship	-0.002		0.001		-0.003		-0.012*		-0.002		-0.000		0.006		-0.012*	
	(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.007)	
Separated/Divorced/Widowed	0.007		0.008		-0.003		-0.004		-0.002		-0.000		0.007		-0.014	
	(0.005)		(0.007)		(0.005)		(0.009)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.010)	
1 or more child	0.005*		0.012**		-0.003		0.004		-0.004**		-0.006*		0.005		-0.002	
	(0.003)		(0.006)		(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.008)	
White British	-0.003		0.007		-0.030***		-0.020*		-0.001		-0.001		0.044***		0.028***	
	(0.004)		(0.007)		(0.007)		(0.011)		(0.004)		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.009)	
Christian	-0.009***		-0.013***		-0.003		-0.003		-0.011***		-0.010***		0.037***		0.031***	
	(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.004)		(0.005)	
Islamic	-0.002		-0.022		0.022		-0.023		-0.021***		-0.008		0.050**		0.030	
	(0.016)		(0.016)		(0.024)		(0.026)		(0.007)		(0.015)		(0.025)		(0.034)	
Other religion	0.004		-0.010		-0.001		0.007		-0.001		-0.005		0.017**		0.018	
	(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.010)		(0.003)		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.012)	
Constant	0.017	0.027***	0.017	0.034***	0.083***	0.069***	0.077***	0.075***	0.060***	0.013***	0.037***	0.015***	-0.036*	0.139***	0.028	0.105***
	(0.013)	(0.001)	(0.019)	(0.002)	(0.018)	(0.001)	(0.027)	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.000)	(0.014)	(0.001)	(0.022)	(0.001)	(0.029)	(0.003)
LAD × wave FEs	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
No. of LADs	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370	370
R-squared	0.031	0.025	0.034	0.028	0.041	0.031	0.040	0.033	0.035	0.025	0.043	0.033	0.157	0.122	0.069	0.037
Observations	29901	31063	12015	12563	29901	31063	12015	12563	29901	31063	12015	12563	29901	31063	12015	12563

Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the LAD level and are reported in parentheses; * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

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